Draft:Ibn Kammuna's Doubt

Ibn Kammuna's Doubt (Arabic: شبهة ابن‌کمونة) is a philosophical objection raised against arguments for Tawhid (monotheism). The doubt posits the theoretical possibility of two Necessary Beings existing as two simple, muba'yin (completely distinct) essences. In this scenario, the attribute of "existence" is applied to them accidentally, allowing a single concept of the "necessity of existence" to be abstracted from and predicated upon both essences. Although this objection appears in the works of Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi, who preceded Ibn Kammuna, it is attributed to the latter among Muslim philosophers. Ibn Kammuna, a commentator on al-Suhrawardi, incorporated this argument into his own writings. Responses to this doubt generally argue that it relies on the flawed assumption that a single concept can be abstracted from multiple, entirely distinct instances qua their multiplicity; however, predicating a single concept upon multiple entities, insofar as they are distinct, is logically impossible.

Introduction of Ibn Kammuna

'Izz al-Dawla Abu l-Rida Sa'd b. Mansur b. Hasan b. Hibat Allah b. Kammuna, known as Ibn Kammuna (d. 683/1284), was a philosopher and physician of Jewish heritage. No specific information is available regarding the time or place of his birth. He was a contemporary of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and engaged in correspondence with him. It is reported that his grandfather, Kammuna, was a Jewish philosopher contemporaneous with Ibn Sina and Abu Rayhan al-Biruni. Ibn Kammuna has occasionally been identified as a Muslim and Shi'a due to the salutations to the Prophet of Islam (s) and the Infallible Imams (a) found in the prefaces of his books. Some critics have referred to him by the epithet "Shaytan al-Hukama'" (The Satan of Philosophers) for formulating this objection against the proofs of monotheism. However, his primary renown stems from the doubts attributed to him.

History and Significance of the Doubt

In his work Nihayat al-hikma, Al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i cites Mulla Sadra to clarify that this doubt was initially articulated by Suhrawardi in his critiques of the proofs offered by Peripatetic philosophers. Subsequently, Ibn Kammuna, as a commentator on Suhrawardi, restated the argument in his own works, leading to its association with his name. According to Sayyid Ja'far Sajjadi, a researcher of philosophy writing for The Great Islamic Encyclopedia, this issue was also addressed and refuted in Avicenna's works. Due to the complexity of resolving it, this doubt is known among Muslim philosophers as "Iftikhar al-Shaytan" (The Pride of Satan).

Statement of the Doubt

Ibn Kammuna's doubt challenges a specific argument for the monotheism of the Necessary Being: the assertion that multiplicity in the Necessary Being would necessitate composition within Its essence and a subsequent need for parts, which is incompatible with the nature of a Necessary Being. The doubt posits that one may hypothesize two Necessary Beings that are simple in their entireties and completely distinct from one another, sharing no common aspect. Despite this complete distinction, the concept of "necessity of existence" could ostensibly be abstracted from both and predicated upon them.

Mulla Hadi Sabzawari articulated the doubt and his refutation in two couplets: Template:Poem

Morteza Motahhari, in his commentary on Sharh al-Manzuma by Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, elaborates on the doubt by outlining four conceivable states of multiplicity or distinction between two entities:

• First State: The two entities share no common aspect and are distinct in their entireties. This is analogous to an individual of quantity versus an individual of quality, where no commonality exists and each belongs to a separate category.

• Second State: The two entities share a part of their essence while differing in another. In this case, the common part encompasses both entities, while the distinguishing part is specific to each. Here, the common element is termed the "genus" and the distinguishing element the "differentia" (fasl).

• Third State: The two entities are identical in their entire essence and quiddity, differing only in external accidents and appendages. Examples include Zayd and 'Amr, or two instances of whiteness or heat, which share their full nature (humanity, color, or sensible quality) but differ due to external accidents.

• Fourth State: The common aspect is identical to the distinguishing aspect. Here, the difference lies in degrees of intensity or perfection, such as the distinction between strong light and weak light.

Based on this classification, while the multiplicity of Necessary Beings necessitates distinction, distinction does not invariably imply composition. Multiplicity implies composition only in the second and third states. The fourth state is inapplicable to the Necessary Being, as it is logically incoherent for two Necessary Beings to exist at different gradations of perfection and deficiency.

Consequently, the first state remains the crux of Ibn Kammuna's doubt. He argues that while multiplicity requires distinction, assuming two simple, distinct Necessary Beings with no common aspect avoids the necessity of composition.

Response to the Doubt

In Nihayat al-hikma, Allama Tabataba'i responds that the doubt rests on the fallacy that a single concept can be abstracted from multiple, distinct instances precisely insofar as they are distinct. He argues that it is impossible to abstract a unified concept from things that are inherently disparate. Furthermore, accepting this doubt implies attributing a quiddity (mahiyya) to the Necessary Being. Since existence is fundamental (asalat al-wujud) and quiddity is mentally posited, attributing a quiddity to the Necessary Being is conceptually invalid.

Shahid Motahhari, elucidating Mulla Hadi Sabzawari's refutation in his commentary on Sharh al-Manzuma, argues: Even assuming two distinct simple essences, they must share the attribute of "necessity of existence." By hypothesis, this necessity is neither identical to nor a part of either essence, meaning it is external to both. Attributes external to an essence are of two types:

• Abstract concepts derived from the essence itself.
• Adjunctive matters (andamami) resulting from external causes.

The necessity of existence cannot be of the second type, as this would imply that the necessity itself is caused, contradicting the very definition of a Necessary Being. This leaves the first option, which aligns with Ibn Kammuna's premise. However, this option is also impossible because a meaning cannot be true of an essence without a criterion (malak); otherwise, any meaning could apply to any essence. Therefore, the applicability of "necessity of existence" to these beings implies a specific characteristic in each that grounds this predication. Consequently, the assumed Necessary Beings must share a real, essential characteristic that serves as the source of abstraction for the concept of necessity. Since they possess a common aspect (ma bihi l-ishtirak) and must also differ to be distinct (ma bihi l-imtiyaz), they are necessarily composite. This logic underpins Mulla Hadi Sabzawari's poetic refutation: it is impossible to abstract a single nature or meaning from disparate things, qua their disparateness, without a common aspect inherent in them.