Burhan al-Siddiqin

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Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn (Arabic: برهان الصّدّیقین) is a well-known theological argument for the existence of God which was mentioned for the first time by al-Farabi. Later, Avicenna introduced a new approach towards this argument and called it Burhan al-Siddiqin.

Explanation

Unlike the teleological or cosmological argument, in this argument the existence of God is not proven through the mediation of anything (middle-terms such as: movement, creation, possibility, etc.) other than God himself. All that is used are mediating entities that are identical with God, such as entities like reality, existence, being, necessity, and so forth.

Development

Indeed, we see a variety of versions of the Burhan al-Siddiqin in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna,[1] al-Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra are among classical philosophers who, after al-Farabi, have expressed some new versions of the argument. Likewise, Anselm's ontological argument is very similar to this kind of argument but he founds his argument upon a conceptual definition.

Some scholars, such as Mirza Mahdi Ashtiyani in his gloss on the Sharh al-manzuma,[2] have listed the different versions of Burhan al-Siddiqin.

Three major explanations of this argument are as follows.

Avicenna's Explanation

Avicenna divides beings into necessary and contingent beings. Then, he states that a contingent being could not come into existence by itself but it must depend upon another being in its existence.

Now, what is another being itself? If it would be a necessary being, so it is our favorable conclusion; but if it would be a contingent being, we will be faced with the same question again and it ends up going into infinite regress or a vicious circle, unless we accept a necessary being.[3] Through these means, he proves the existence of God as the necessary being.

Mulla Sadra's Explanation

Mulla Sadra presents another new version of Burhan al-Siddiqin and he says that this proof is the most clear and honorable of proofs for the existence of God.

He believes in the reality of the existence and the impossibility of its inexistence. Likewise, he states this existence is free of any condition and limitation in its essence. Reality exists just because it exists, neither because of some assumptions nor something else. So, reality in its essence is equal to being independent of others and it exists unconditionally. And it equals to eternal necessary being. Therefore, reality of existence in its essence –and in itself without any conditions is equal to the eternal essence of God. So, the priority of existence leads us directly to the eternal essence of God.[4]

Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i's Explanation

Tabataba'i in his commentary on the book of al-Asfar by Mulla Sadra presents his explanation of the argument. Indeed, his argument is independent of any medium (middle terms) that is independent of any philosophical principles and presuppositions, even the priority of existence. He says: before any discussion about a two-cornered debate of the priority of existence/the priority of essence, we admit reality in itself and it is the point of separation from the skepticism. We deny skepticism and find that every reasonable individual inevitably accepts it.

Then, he states that this reality is one that cannot adopt nonexistence and nullity in its essence. Even the supposition of the nonexistence and nullity of reality itself necessitates its existence. In other words, if we suppose that all realities are invalid and inexistence in a particular time or always, this means that in reality, all realities are nonexistent (and this in turn will prove the existence of a reality again). Likewise, if the sophist assumes that all things are illusionary, or doubts in their reality, indeed in his view, those things are really illusionary and their realities are really dubitable (this means that reality is proven from the very point it was rejected), while reality in essence, and cannot adopt any inexistence and nullity, resulting in its necessity by itself. And this necessary essence is equal to eternal essence.

Therefore, there is a reality that is eternal and necessary by itself that makes other things that are real, dependent on it in their reality and existence. It is from this that the thinker finds that the existence of an eternal and necessary being through itself is obvious for everyone and the proofs for the existence of the necessary being are actually nothing but reminders.[5]

Quranic and Hadith Grounds

Burhan al-Siddiqin, which is presented in theological context with philosophical methods, is thoroughly adopted with Quranic thoughts, Islamic hadiths, and mysticism. Mulla Sadra says he was inspired by mystical intuition in forming this proof. And we see many verses of the Qur'an and some hadith in all versions of the argument with excellent evidential forces.[6] Some of them are mentioned here:

  • Soon We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their own souls until it becomes clear to them that He is the real. Is it not sufficient that your Lord is witness to all things? [7]
  • I recognized you by you![8]
  • Oh, who signifies to its essence by its essence![9]
  • How could someone justifies your existence based on something which depends on you in its existence!?[10]
  • Do other things have some kind of appearance or clarification which you lack, till they clarify you?[11]

See Also

Notes

  1. Muḥammad Riḍāʾī, Ilāhīyāt-i falsafī, p. 215.
  2. Āshtīyānī,Taʿlīqa bar sharḥ-i manzūma-yi ḥikmat-i Sabzwārī, p. 488-497.
  3. Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, vol. 3, p. 18-28.
  4. Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqlīyat al-ʾarbaʿa, vol. 6, p. 14-16.
  5. Ḥāshīyīa Ṭabāṭabāʾī, al-Ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya, vol. 6, p. 14-15.
  6. Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, vol. 3, p. 66.
  7. Qur'an 41:53: سَنُريهِم آياتِنا فِي الآفاقِ وَفي أَنفُسِهِم حَتّىٰ يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُم أَنَّهُ الحَقُّ أَوَلَم يَكفِ بِرَبِّكَ أَنَّهُ عَلىٰ كُلِّ شَيءٍ شَهيدٌ
  8. Qummī, Kullīyāt-i Mafātīḥ al-jinān, beginning of Supplication of ʾAbū Ḥamza al-Thumālī, p. 316.
  9. Qummī, Kullīyāt-i Mafātīḥ al-jinān, Al-Ṣabāḥ Supplication, p. 104.
  10. Qummī, Kullīyāt-i Mafātīḥ al-jinān, supplication of 'Arafa by Imam al-Husayn (a), p. 467.
  11. Qummī, Kullīyāt-i Mafātīḥ al-jinān, supplication of 'Arafa by Imam al-Husayn (a), p. 467.

References

  • Āshtīyānī, Mahdī. Taʿlīqa bar sharḥ-i manzūma-yi ḥikmat-i Sabzwārī. Edited by ʿAbd al-Jawād Falāṭūrī and Mahdī Muḥaqqiq, Tehran: 1367 Sh.
  • Ibn Sīnā, ʿAbd Allāh. Al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt. with the commentary of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Sharḥ al-sharḥ li Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī, Tehran: 1403 AH.
  • Iṣfahānī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Tuḥfat al-ḥakīm. Annotated by Mahdī Ḥāʾirī Yazdī. Tehrān: Markaz-i Nashr-i Islāmī, 1380 AH.
  • Jawādī Āmulī, ʿAbd Allāh. Tabyīn-i barāhīn-i ithbāt-i Khudā. Qom: Nashr-i Isrāʾ, 1390 Sh.
  • Muḥammad Riḍāʾī, Muḥammad. Ilāhīyāt-i falsafī. Qom: Būstān-i Kitāb, 1391 SH.
  • Murwārīd, Maḥmūd. Taʾammulī dar burhān-i ṣīddīqīn bi taqrīr-i ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī. Naqd-o-Nazar Journal, No, 45-46, 1386 SH.
  • Qummī, Abbās. Mafātīḥ al-jinān. with Persian translation. Tehran: 1369 Sh.
  • Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm. Al-Ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqlīyat al-ʾarbaʿa. Qom: Al-Maktabat al-Muṣṭafawīyya, 1386 AH.