Goodness and Badness

Priority: b, Quality: c
From wikishia

The question of goodness and badness is a theological issue that focuses on whether the moral value of actions is essential to them or if it is determined solely by divine command and prohibition. Muslim scholars have extensively debated this issue. Shia and Mu'tazilite scholars advocate for the concept of rational goodness and badness, asserting that the value of actions is essential and that reason can discern the goodness or badness of certain actions. In contrast, Ash'arite scholars argue that goodness and badness are determined by religious legislation, meaning that actions are not essentially good or bad; rather, whatever God commands is good, and whatever He prohibits is bad.

The discussion of the goodness and badness of actions also extends into the discipline of the principles of jurisprudence. If the rational goodness or badness of actions is accepted, then reason or intellect becomes a source for inferring or deducing Sharia laws, as upheld by Shia scholars in this field.

The Place of Goodness and Badness

The problem of the goodness and badness of actions is a significant issue in Islamic theology, serving as the foundation for many other theological debates.[1] Muslim scholars have attached great importance to this topic and have extensively discussed it.[2] In theological writings, this issue is often explored in the context of God's actions and as part of the arguments for divine justice.[3]

According to Ja'far Subhani, the issue of goodness and badness has applications in other disciplines, such as ethics and the principles of jurisprudence.[4]

In ethics, to accept rational goodness and badness is to say that moral values are absolute, while rejecting it suggests that these values are relative.[5]

In the principles of jurisprudence, this issue is discussed under the section on "rational implications." Reason is considered a source for inferring and deducing Sharia laws only if the rational goodness or badness of actions is established.[6]

Shiite and Sunni books of theology[7] and principles of jurisprudence[8] extensively discuss the problem of goodness or badness of actions.

The Main Question Regarding Goodness and Badness

The problem of the goodness or badness of actions focuses on the criterion for determining their moral value: Do real goodness and badness exist, or are they merely conventional and constructed notions, where whatever God commands is good and whatever He prohibits is bad?[9]

The former position is known as essential goodness or badness, while the latter is referred to as religious or Sharia-based goodness or badness.[10]

The Debate on Goodness and Badness

Muslim scholars disagree on whether the goodness or badness of actions is rational or religious. Shia[11] and Mu'tazilite[12] scholars advocate for rational goodness and badness, while Ash'arite[13] scholars support the idea of religious or Sharia-based goodness and badness.

Shia and Mu'tazilite theologians assert that actions are inherently good or bad, regardless of whether God declares them so. This implies that reason can independently judge the goodness or badness of certain actions.[14]

In contrast, Ash'arite scholars believe that the goodness or badness of actions can only be known through Sharia laws.[15] If Sharia commands an action, it is considered good; if it prohibits an action, it is deemed bad. Outside of Sharia, no action is inherently good or bad.[16]

Origin of the Problem

It is said that the issue of the goodness or badness of actions was discussed in other religions[17] and Greek philosophy[18] before Islam. However, it was the Muslims who devoted significant attention to the issue.[19] Under the Mu'tazila, starting in the second/eighth century, the question of goodness and badness became a serious topic of debate.[20] Subsequently, Ash'arite scholars, who opposed the notion of rational goodness and badness, entered the debate and introduced the idea of religious or Sharia-based goodness and badness.[21]

Arguments for Rational Goodness and Badness

Some of the arguments presented by Shia scholars in favor of rational goodness and badness are as follows:

  • Goodness or badness is self-evident. For example, human reason can judge the goodness or badness of injustice without reference to Sharia. We certainly understand that kindness toward others is good and praise those who act kindly. Conversely, we recognize that wronging others is bad and condemn those who do so.[22]
  • If we do not understand the goodness or badness of actions through reason, we would also struggle to understand it through Sharia. If reason cannot recognize that lying is bad, then it might lead to the possibility that God could lie. As a result, if God declares something to be good or bad, we cannot be certain of its true nature.[23]
  • Without rational goodness or badness, the validity of divine religion cannot be established. In such a case, it would not be considered wrong for God to perform any actions, including granting miraculous powers to those who are not true prophets. This would make it impossible to use miracles as proof of prophethood, thereby undermining the establishment of any divine religion.[24]

Arguments for Sharia-Based Goodness or Badness

Here are some of the arguments presented by Ash'arite scholars for sharia-based goodness or badness of actions:

  • If lying were inherently bad, independent of any command from the Sharia legislator, then every instance of lying would be considered bad, which is clearly not the case. For example, we recognize that a lie intended to save the life of a prophet would not be deemed bad.[25]
  • Suppose someone threatens to kill another person the next day. If they carry out the threat, they have done something wrong. If they do not, they have lied, which, according to the theory of rational goodness or badness, is considered bad in all circumstances. Since we agree that it is not permissible for the first person to kill the second, it follows that lying is not absolutely bad.[26]
  • Advocates of rational goodness or badness believe that God is obligated to avoid bad actions. For example, they argue that if an individual shows gratitude for God's blessings, it becomes obligatory for God to reward that person. However, this reasoning is flawed, as we cannot attribute any obligations to God. Obligation implies a higher authority imposing it, and there is no being higher than God who can make anything obligatory for Him.[27]

Bibliography

Shia and Sunni scholars have addressed the problem of the goodness or badness of actions in their works on theology[28] and principles of jurisprudence.[29] Additionally, some monographs have been authored specifically on this topic, including:

  • Husn wa qubh-i 'aqli ya paya-ha-yi akhlaq-i jawdan (Rational goodness and badness or foundations of eternal morality) by Jafar Subhani.
  • Husn wa qubh-i dhati wa 'aqli az manzar-i danishmandan-i Islami (Essential and rational goodness and badness from the perspective of Islamic scholars) by Hadi Wahdanifar.
  • Qa'ida-yi kalami-yi husn wa qubh-i 'aqli (The theological principle of rational goodness and badness) by Rida Birinjkar and Mahdi Nusratiyan.
  • Husn wa qubh-i dhati wa 'aqli az manzar-i riwayat-i Islami (Essential and rational goodness and badness from the perspective of hadiths) by Hadi Wahdanifar and Zakiyya Biygum Hussayni.

Notes

  1. Subḥānī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ-i ʿaqlī yā pāya-hā-yi akhlāq-i jāwdān, p. 7-8.
  2. Hāshimī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ", p. 364.
  3. See: Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, p. 279-280.
  4. Subḥānī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ-i ʿaqlī yā pāya-hā-yi akhlāq-i jāwdān, p. 7-8.
  5. Subḥānī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ-i ʿaqlī yā pāya-hā-yi akhlāq-i jāwdān, p. 7-8.
  6. Subḥānī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ-i ʿaqlī yā pāya-hā-yi akhlāq-i jāwdān, p. 7-8.
  7. See: Ḥillī, Nahj al-ḥaq wa Kashf al-ṣidq, p. 82-85; Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 348.
  8. Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, vol. 2, p. 271; Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, p. 123-140.
  9. Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, vol. 2, p. 271; Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, p. 279-280.
  10. Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, vol. 2, p. 271; Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, p. 279-280.
  11. Ḥillī, Nahj al-ḥaq wa Kashf al-ṣidq, p. 82.
  12. Shahristānī, al-Milal wa al-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 58.
  13. Shahristānī, al-Milal wa al-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 115.
  14. Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, p. 280-281.
  15. Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 348.
  16. Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, p. 281.
  17. Pākatchī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ", p. 644-645.
  18. Hāshimī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ", p. 364.
  19. Hāshimī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ", p. 364.
  20. Pākatchī, Ḥusn wa qubḥ", p. 646.
  21. Rabbānī Gulpaygānī, Tārīkh wa taṭawwur-i qāʿida-yi ḥusn wa qubḥ dar kalām-i Islāmī, p. 22-23.
  22. Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, p. 281.
  23. Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, p. 281.
  24. Ḥillī, Nahj al-ḥaq wa Kashf al-ṣidq, p, 84.
  25. Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 348.
  26. Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 349.
  27. Isfarāyinī, al-Tabṣīr, p. 171.
  28. See: Ḥillī, Nahj al-ḥaq wa Kashf al-ṣidq, p. 82-85; Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn, vol. 1, p. 348.
  29. See: Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, vol. 2, p. 271; Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1, p. 123-240.

References

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  • Ḥillī, al-Ḥasan b. Yūsuf al-. Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-iʿtiqād. Beirut: Muʾassisat al-Aʿlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, [n.d].
  • Ḥillī, al-Ḥasan b. Yūsuf al-. Nahj al-ḥaq wa Kashf al-ṣidq. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Lubnānī, 1982.
  • Isfarāyinī, Shahfūr b. Ṭāhir. Al-Tabṣīr fī al-dīn wa tamyīz al-firqa al-nājiya ʿan al-firaq al-hālikīn. Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kitāb, 1403 AH.
  • Muẓaffar, Muḥammad Riḍā al-. Uṣūl al-fiqh. Qom: Intishārāt-i Islāmī, 1430 AH.
  • Pākatchī, Aḥmad. Ḥusn wa qubḥ". In Dāʾirat al-maʿārif-i buzurg-i Islāmī. Volume 20. Tehran: Markaz-i Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, 1391 Sh.
  • Rabbānī Gulpaygānī, ʿAlī. Tārīkh wa taṭawwur-i qāʿida-yi ḥusn wa qubḥ dar kalām-i Islāmī. In Faṣlnāma-yi Kalām-i Islāmī 1 (1371 Sh).
  • Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. Al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-Dīn. Cairo: Maktabat al-Kullīyyāt al-Azharīyya, 1986.
  • Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. Al-Maḥṣūl. Beirut: Muʾassisat al-Risāla, 1418 AH.
  • Shahristānī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm. Al-Milal wa al-niḥal. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1415 AH.
  • Subḥānī, Jaʿfar. Ḥusn wa qubḥ-i ʿaqlī yā pāya-hā-yi akhlāq-i jāwdān. Qom: Muʾassisat Imām al-Ṣādiq, 1381 Sh.