Unbearable Obligation

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Unbearable Obligation (Arabic: تکلیف مالایُطاق) is a theological term referring to a situation in which God obliges man to do something beyond his capacity. The main question is whether or not Allah imposes such obligation over his creatures. Ash'aritess believe such act by Allah is rationally probable, while Mu'tazila and Imamiyya believe it is rationally impossible for Allah to do so.

Meaning

Whether Allah imposes unbearable obligation, is a subset of the general discussion about obligation in theology. This discussion is associated with various topics such as: the Divine Omniscience, Divine Justice, Good and Evil, obligation and human capacity. Each of theological schools has its own theory in this regard. Before and more than anything, the result of such debate is dependent on how the ability of human beings is conceived, and more or less, it involves a discussion about Divine justice. All theologians agree that an agent has the ability to do something while actually doing it, but whether the given agent possessed the ability before starting the action, is disputed; as some theologians argue that only during the time of activity, God provides the agent with needed ability, not beforehand.

Among different Islamic theological schools, three of them namely Ash'arism, Mu'tazila and Imamiyya have more contributions to this discussion.

View of Ash'arites

Ash'arites believe it is possible for Allah to impose unbearable obligations upon human beings, i.e. to task them with something beyond their capacity. The reason for this, in their view, is that all required abilities for all actions, are given by God to the agent simultaneously, not before the action; so, before actually engaging in any action, the agent is incapable of doing it. Based on this view, it is possible that Allah commands man to do something beyond his capacity at the time, but once man intends to engage in fulfilling his task, Allah gives him the needed ability.[1]

They have provided two types of proof for their theory, revelation-narrative based evidences and rational arguments.

Qur'anic Evidences

According to the view of Ash'arites, the Qur'anic case of commanding infidels to believe in Allah is an example of unbearable obligation, since prior to the belief, an infidel cannot hear the truth nor accept it. It is only after the time one believes that one can accept the truth.[2] There are verses in the Qur'an indicating that infidels are incapable of hearing the truth[3] and it is stated that they cannot believe[4]. According to Ash'arites, it is true that Allah has obliged man to believe, however, in the some verses, Allah states infidels have no capacity to believe; therefore commanding them to have faith is an unbearable obligation.

Rational Argument

Fakhr al-Din al-Razi has supported the possibility of unbearable obligation with a rational argument based on Allah's Omniscience. He argues:

  • Allah is omniscient.
  • Allah has stated in the Qur'an that the infidels cannot believe.[5]
  • Allah has also obliged infidels to have faith.
  • Being aware of their actual incapability, Allah has ordered them to believe.
  • Therefore, it is possible that Allah tasks man with something beyond his capacity which in fact, is an instance of unbearable obligation.[6]

'Adliyya

The two schools of Mu'tazila and Imamiyya, which are called 'Adliyya, believe conversion of an infidel to Islam is not only possible but in fact an actual reality that has taken place for countless times. Since obliging man to do something postulates his ability for its fulfillment, the infidel must have possessed the ability of accepting the faith before being required to do so. Hence, obligating infidels to believe is not an unbearable obligation.

These two schools of theology have provided two sets of reasoning for their theory, Qur'anic evidences and rational arguments.

Qur'anic Evidences

Some verses of Qur'an have been held by Mu'tazila and Imamiyya as supporting evidences for their particular view. These verses state that man is able of carrying out his divine obligations and no unbearable obligation would be imposed by Allah over human beings[7]

Rational Arguments

These theologians hold that power, tendency, freewill and other requirements for obligation, are equally existent in everyone before choosing to believe or to reject.[8] They support their claim with some rational arguments:

Incompatiblity with Divine Justice

Obligation is conscionable only when a person possess the ability of fulfilling it. Therefore, if Allah imposes unbearable obligation upon man, that contradicts His Justice. The steps of this argument are as follows:

  • Allah is all Just.
  • According to the Divine Justice, Allah must reward and punish the righteous and wrongdoer respectively and based on the scale of their task-fulfillments.
  • If Allah imposes unbearable obligation i.e. something beyond man's capacity, then questions and eventually punishes man for his failure to carry it out; this means Allah punishes man arbitrarily which surely is against the Divine Justice.

Evilness

  • To impose unbearable obligation is evil.
  • Any wise entity, by definition, does not commit an evil action.
  • Allah is All Wise.
  • Therefore, Allah does not impose unbearable obligation that contradicts the Divine Wisdom.

Futility

  • Allah is All Wise.
  • Any wise entity, by definition, does not engage in pointless and futile activities
  • To oblige man with something beyond his capacity is pointless
  • Therefore if Allah orders an infidel to believe while the infidel is not capable of doing so, this means Allah has made a pointless attempt; this clearly is against the Divine Wisdom.

Refuting Ash'arites' Arguments

Unlike Ash'arites, Mu'tazila and Imamiyya believe it is possible for an infidel to believe, and the reason they do not accept the truth, is dependent on their own will.

Also in response to the rational argument by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, these theologians hold the Divine Omniscience as irrelevant to the discussion of unbearable obligation in that sense. They argue:

  • The Divine Knowledge does not predestine the actual realities but merely reflect them.
  • Infidels who do not believe, are faithless on the basis of their own choice.
  • Therefore the proposition: Allah knows whether they believe or reject; can correctly be read as: Allah knows whether or not they choose to believe by their own freewill. Hence there is no error in Divine Knowledge nor any intervention in individual freewill.

Notes

  1. ↑ Ashʿarī, al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna, p. 50-51; Ibn Fūrak, Māqalāt al-shaykh Abu l-Ḥasan Ashʿarī, p. 111; Bāqlānī, al-Tamhīd, p. 294; Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, vol. 4, p. 294; ʿĪjī, al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām, p. 330; Fakhr al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, vol. 7, p. 140; Fakhr al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 3, p. 305; Shahristānī, al-Milal wa al-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 68.
  2. ↑ Ashʿarī, al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna, p. 50-51; Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʾ fī al-radd ʿalā ahl al-zigh wa al-bidaʾ, p. 58; Bāqlānī, al-Tamhīd, p. 294.
  3. ↑ They could neither listen, nor did they use to see. (Qur'an 11:20); Those whose eyes were blindfolded to My remembrance and who could not hear. (Qur'an 18:101)
  4. ↑ As for the faithless, it is the same to them whether you warn them or do not warn them, they will not have faith. (Qur'an 2:6)
  5. ↑ Qur'an 2:6
  6. ↑ Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, vol. 4, p. 300.
  7. ↑ Allah does not impose upon any soul a duty but to the extent of its ability. (Qur'an 2:286); Nothing kept the people from believing when guidance came to them, but their saying, "Has Allah sent a human as an apostle?!" (Qur'an 17:97)
  8. ↑ Mānkdīm, Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 419; Ṭūsī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 121-123.

References

  • Ashʿarī, Abu l-Ḥasan ʿAlī. Al-Lumaʾ fī al-radd ʿalā ahl al-zigh wa al-bidaʾ. Edited by Richard J. McCarthy. Beirut: 1952.
  • Ashʿarī, Abu l-Ḥasan ʿAlī. Al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna. Medina: [n.n], 1975.
  • Baḥrānī, Ibn Maytham al-. Qawāʿid al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām. Qom: 1398 AH.
  • Bāqlānī, Muḥammad. Al-Tamhīd. Edited by Richard J. McCarthy. Beirut: 1952.
  • Fakhr al-Rāzī, Muḥammad b. al-ʿUmar al-. Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, [n.d].
  • Fakhr al-Rāzī, Muḥammad b. al-ʿUmar al-. Al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya. Edited by Aḥmad Ḥijāzī Saqqā. Beirut: 1407 AH.
  • Ḥumṣī, Maḥmūd. Al-Munqidh min al-taqlīd. Qom: 1412 AH.
  • Ḥillī, al-Ḥasan b. Yūsuf al-. Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūt. Edited by Muḥammad Najmī Zanjānī. Qom: 1363 Sh.
  • Ibn Fūrak, Muḥammad. Māqalāt al-shaykh Abu l-Ḥasan Ashʿarī. Edited by Daniel Gimaret. Beirut: 1986.
  • ʿĪjī, ʿAḍud al-Dīn. Al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām. Beirut: Ālam al-Kutub, [n.d].
  • Mānkdīm, Aḥmad. Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa. Edited by ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān. Cairo: 1384 AH/1965.
  • Shahristānī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm. Al-Milal wa al-niḥal. Edited by William Cureton. Leipzig: [n.n], 1923.
  • Ṭūsī, Muḥammad. Al-Iqtiṣād. Beirut: 1406 AH-1986.
  • Taftāzānī, Masʿūd b. ʿUmar al-. Sharḥ al-maqāṣid. Edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra. Beirut: 1409 AH.
  • Taftāzānī, Masʿūd b. ʿUmar al-. Sharḥ al-aqāʿid al-nasafiyya. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAdnān Darwīsh. Beirut: 2005.
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