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Asālat al-Haqīqa (Arabic: أصالة الحقيقة, lit. 'the principle of literalness') denotes the hermeneutic principle of prioritizing a word's literal (real) meaning over any potential figurative (metaphorical) interpretations. This principle is invoked when there is uncertainty regarding a speaker's intent concerning an expression that oscillates between a literal and a figurative sense, provided no context (qarina) exists to suggest a metaphorical usage. Asālat al-Haqīqa is classified as one of the paramount Verbal principles (al-usul al-lafziyya) within the science of the principles of jurisprudence. Its primary function is to discern the original intent of the Legislator in the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Infallibles (a) for the derivation of legal rulings.

The evidentiary basis (hujjiyya) for asalat al-haqiqa is grounded in the conduct of rational people (sirat al-'uqala') and the practice of the religious community (sirat al-mutasharri'a). This principle is binding upon both the listener and the speaker; consequently, neither party may posit a claim contrary to the literal import of the expression without evidence. Scholars of legal theory maintain that asalat al-haqiqa, like other verbal principles, is an instance and sub-category of asalat al-zuhur (the principle of apparent meaning) and is reducible to it.

Position and Importance

Asalat al-haqiqa is a technical term in the science of principles, discussed within the sections on linguistics and Verbal principles.[1] It is regarded as one of the most significant verbal principles.[2] Along with other verbal principles, asalat al-haqiqa is categorized as a valid conjecture (zann) that, in terms of authoritative value, ranks alongside certainty; for this reason, these are termed "scientific proofs" or "specific conjectures" (al-zunun al-khassa).[3] The primary utility of these principles lies in identifying the Legislator's original intent within the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Infallibles (a) to facilitate the derivation of legal rulings.[4] Furthermore, asalat al-haqiqa is considered a rational axiom rather than a purely devotional (ta'abbudi) religious edict.[5]

Conceptual Analysis

Conceptually, asalat al-haqiqa entails the precedence of the literal definition over figurative interpretation whenever the speaker's intent is ambiguous.[6] This principle applies when both the literal and figurative meanings of a word are understood, yet there is hesitation regarding the specific intent of the speaker or writer, and no context exists to suggest a figurative usage. In such scenarios, based on asalat al-haqiqa, the word is interpreted in its literal sense.[7]

Some researchers in the science of principles articulate the rationale for this principle by positing that the literal sense constitutes the "default" (asl) status of a word,[8] whereas figurative usage necessitates a contextual clue (qarina);[9] therefore, the presumption is that the speaker intends the literal meaning.[10] A common example is the word asad (lion). Literally, it denotes a predatory animal, but it is also used figuratively to describe a brave person. If the audience is unsure whether the speaker intends the animal or the brave man, and no context is present, asalat al-haqiqa dictates that the literal meaning—the predatory animal—is intended.[11]

Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar asserts that both the interlocutor and the speaker are bound by the literal meaning, and one cannot rely merely on the theoretical possibility of a figurative intent.[12] If the speaker intends a figurative meaning, they are obligated to provide a context for it.[13] To employ a word in a figurative or homonymous (shared) sense, the presence of context is essential;[14] otherwise, the word must be carried to its literal meaning or remain ambiguous (mujmal).[15]

Doubt in the Speaker's Intent

The scope for applying asalat al-haqiqa is strictly limited to instances of doubt regarding the speaker's intent. It is not applicable in cases of doubt concerning the linguistic coinage (wad) or the fundamental definition of a term.[16][17]

Doubt in the speaker's intent arises when the possible meanings of a word are known, but the specific intention of the speaker remains unclear. In such cases, determining the intended meaning requires recourse to principles and rules established for identifying intent, collectively known as Verbal principles (al-usul al-lafziyya).[18] These are categorized into positive verbal principles—such as asalat al-haqiqa, asalat al-zuhur, asalat al-itlaq, and asalat al-'umum—and negative verbal principles, such as the principle of the absence of context, the principle of the absence of restriction (taqyid), and the principle of the absence of specification (takhsis).[19]

Some scholars maintain that if the speaker's intent is known, but the quality or manner of usage is doubtful, asalat al-haqiqa cannot be invoked. For example, if it is known that by saying "I saw a lion," the speaker meant a brave person, but there is doubt as to whether they used the word "lion" literally (claiming the man is a lion) or figuratively, one cannot resort to asalat al-haqiqa to declare the usage literal.[20]

Proof of Authority

The primary evidence for the authority of all verbal principles, including asalat al-haqiqa, lies in the conduct of rational people.[21] The Divine Lawgiver is understood to have endorsed this rational foundation; had He rejected it, He would have prohibited the use of this principle or established an alternative method of communication.[22]

In addition to rational practice, some scholars cite the practice of the faithful (sirat al-mutasharri'a)[23] or the conduct of the Companions and the Infallibles (a). They argue that the practical conduct of the Imams' companions was to act upon the apparent meaning of words, deriving the Lawgiver's intent through the "precedent" meaning (al-ma'na al-mutabadir). Consequently, if acting upon apparent meaning and discovering intent through verbal appearance were rejected or considered an erroneous habit, the Infallible Imams (a) would have prohibited their companions from doing so.[24]

Reversion to Asalat al-Zuhur

A prevalent view holds that all Verbal principles, including asalat al-haqiqa, are reducible to asalat al-zuhur.[25] In other words, asalat al-haqiqa is merely an instance[26] and sub-category of asalat al-zuhur[27] and possesses no independence of its own.[28] Therefore, its validity is contingent upon its consistency with asalat al-zuhur.[29] According to Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar, author of Usul al-fiqh, the term "asalat al-zuhur" can validly replace asalat al-haqiqa and all other verbal principles.[30] This is because in all verbal principles, there exists a possibility of a meaning contrary to the apparent sense; by implementing these principles, one adheres to the apparent meaning of the word. In the principle of literalness, specifically, the possibility of a meaning contrary to the appearance (i.e., metaphor) is acknowledged, but by implementing the principle, the ruling is derived from the word's appearance, which dictates its literal sense.[31]

Notes

  1. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 74; Subḥānī, al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1387 Sh, p. 18.
  2. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 74; Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, 1389 Sh, p. 197.
  3. ↑ Gurjī, Tārīkh-i fiqh wa fuqahā, 1421 AH, pp. 251-252.
  4. ↑ Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, 1389 Sh, p. 680.
  5. ↑ Ṭabāṭabāʾī Qummī, Ārāʾunā fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1371 Sh, vol. 1, p. 27.
  6. ↑ Subḥānī, al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1387 Sh, p. 19; Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, 1389 Sh, p. 197.
  7. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 76; Subḥānī, al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1387 Sh, p. 19.
  8. ↑ Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, 1389 Sh, p. 197.
  9. ↑ ʿAdālat, Tarjuma wa sharḥ-i fārsī-yi al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1385 Sh, p. 64.
  10. ↑ Shīrwānī, Taḥrīr-i uṣūl-i fiqh, 1385 Sh, p. 34.
  11. ↑ Subḥānī, al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1387 Sh, p. 19; Sayyid Ashrafī, Nihāyat al-īṣāl, 1385 Sh, vol. 1, p. 235.
  12. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 74.
  13. ↑ Sayyid Ashrafī, Nihāyat al-īṣāl, 1385 Sh, vol. 1, p. 239.
  14. ↑ ʿAdālat, Tarjuma wa sharḥ-i fārsī-yi al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1385 Sh, p. 80.
  15. ↑ ʿAdālat, Tarjuma wa sharḥ-i fārsī-yi al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1385 Sh, p. 80.
  16. ↑ Such as the word ṣaʿīd, where its literal meaning is doubted; in this case, the ruling is made through "precedence" (tabādur), "correctness of attribution and negation" (ṣiḥḥat al-ḥaml wa al-salb), or the explicit statement of lexicographers regarding the real meaning. (Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 76; Walāʾī, Farhang-i tashrīḥī-yi iṣṭilāḥāt-i uṣūl, 1387 Sh, p. 106; Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, 1389 Sh, pp. 216-217.)
  17. ↑ Asgharī, Uṣūl al-fiqh bā sharḥ-i fārsī, 1386 Sh, vol. 1, pp. 50-52.
  18. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 76; Subḥānī, al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1387 Sh, p. 18; Walāʾī, Farhang-i tashrīḥī-yi iṣṭilāḥāt-i uṣūl, 1387 Sh, p. 106; Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, 1389 Sh, pp. 216-217.
  19. ↑ Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, 1389 Sh, pp. 216-217.
  20. ↑ Fāḍil Lankarānī, Īḍāḥ al-kifāya, 1385 Sh, vol. 1, p. 184.
  21. ↑ Ākhūnd Khurāsānī, Kifāyat al-uṣūl, 1409 AH, p. 222; Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, pp. 76-77.
  22. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, pp. 76-77.
  23. ↑ Rifāʿī, Muḥāḍirāt fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1421 AH, vol. 1, p. 410.
  24. ↑ Rifāʿī, Muḥāḍirāt fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1421 AH, vol. 1, pp. 410-413; Ṣadr, Durūs fī ʿilm al-uṣūl, 1418 AH, vol. 1, p. 102.
  25. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 76; Walāʾī, Farhang-i tashrīḥī-yi iṣṭilāḥāt-i uṣūl, 1387 Sh, p. 88.
  26. ↑ Subḥānī, al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1387 Sh, p. 20; Gurjī, Tārīkh-i fiqh wa fuqahā, 1421 AH, pp. 251-252.
  27. ↑ ʿAdālat, Tarjuma wa sharḥ-i fārsī-yi al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, 1385 Sh, p. 69.
  28. ↑ Sayyid Ashrafī, Nihāyat al-īṣāl, 1385 Sh, vol. 1, p. 254.
  29. ↑ Shīrwānī, Taḥrīr-i uṣūl-i fiqh, 1385 Sh, p. 36.
  30. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 76.
  31. ↑ Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 1430 AH, vol. 1, p. 76.

References

  • Ākhūnd Khurāsānī, Muḥammad Kāẓim, Kifāyat al-uṣūl, Qom, Muʾassasa Āl al-Bayt (a), 1409 AH.
  • Asgharī, ʿAbd Allāh, Uṣūl al-fiqh (bā sharḥ-i fārsī), Qom, 2nd ed., 1386 Sh.
  • Rifāʿī, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muḥāḍirāt fī uṣūl al-fiqh: sharḥ al-Ḥalqa al-Thāniyya, Qom, Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1421 AH.
  • Subḥānī Tabrīzī, Jaʿfar, al-Mūjaz fī uṣūl al-fiqh, Qom, Imam Sadiq Institute, 14th ed., 1387 Sh.
  • Sayyid Ashrafī, Ḥasan, Nihāyat al-īṣāl (Sharḥ-i fārsī-yi Uṣūl al-fiqh), Qom, Nashr-i Quds, 1385 Sh.
  • Shīrwānī, ʿAlī, Taḥrīr-i uṣūl-i fiqh, Qom, Dār al-ʿIlm, 2nd ed., 1385 Sh.
  • Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir, Durūs fī ʿilm al-uṣūl, Qom, Intishārāt-i Islāmī, 5th ed., 1418 AH.
  • Ṣanqūr, Muḥammad, al-Muʿjam al-uṣūlī, Qom, Manshūrāt al-Ṭayyār, 2nd ed., 1428 AH.
  • Ṭabāṭabāʾī Qummī, Taqī, Ārāʾunā fī uṣūl al-fiqh, Qom, Nashr-i Maḥallātī, 1371 Sh.
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  • Fāḍil Lankarānī, Muḥammad, Īḍāḥ al-kifāya, Qom, Nashr-i Nūḥ, 5th ed., 1385 Sh.
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  • Markaz-i Iṭṭilāʿāt wa Madārik-i Islāmī, Farhang-nāma-yi uṣūl-i fiqh, Qom, Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, 1389 Sh.
  • Muẓaffar, Muḥammad Riḍā, Uṣūl al-fiqh, Qom, Intishārāt-i Islāmī, 5th ed., 1430 AH.
  • Nājim Ḥiṣārī, Muḥammad & ʿAlī Muḥammadiyān, "Tabyīn wa taḥlīl-i mawāḍiʿ-i kārbard-i asālat al-haqīqa dar ārā-yi fiqhī-yi bāb-i ḥajj", Mīqāt-i Ḥajj, No. 114, Bahman 1399 Sh.
  • Walāʾī, ʿĪsā, Farhang-i tashrīḥī-yi iṣṭilāḥāt-i uṣūl, Tehran, Nashr-i Ney, 6th ed., 1387 Sh.
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