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Islamophobia

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Islamophobia refers to the deliberate fostering of fear and hatred toward Islam and its manifestations. It enables various forms of discrimination, violence, and deprivation against Muslims and Islamic institutions and organizations. Islamophobia is considered a religious, political, cultural, and social phenomenon. Despite its historical roots, it has become more prevalent since the late 20th century, particularly following the September 11 attacks at the start of the 21st century.

According to researchers, some factors contributing to the spread of Islamophobia include: Western ignorance of the true nature of Islam, negative depictions and manipulation of public opinion by Western media, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and violent actions by fundamentalists, historical conflicts between Islamic and Western governments, and contradictions between European and Islamic values.

To counter the spread of Islamophobia, several strategies have been proposed: developing joint Islamic media initiatives to represent a positive image of the Muslim world, establishing systematic and extensive communication with Western religious institutions, strengthening intra-civilizational exchanges to weaken extremist and fundamentalist movements, and fostering proximity among Islamic denominations.

In response to this issue, actions have been taken, including Ayatollah Khamenei's message to the youth of Europe and North America encouraging them to refer to Islamic texts to gain a true understanding of Islam.

Definition

Islamophobia is defined as an intense, irrational fear and hatred toward Islam and Muslims.[1] According to the report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, it is characterized as fear and hostility toward Muslims, leading to their exclusion from economic, social, and public life in non-Islamic countries and resulting in discrimination against them.[2] The term "Islamophobia," despite its historical roots in the long evolution of global political and social transformations,[3] emerged as a relatively new term in the 1980s, and became prevalent following the September 11 attacks.[4] During this period, Islam was labeled as an "evil empire" in place of communism and portrayed as a threat to global peace and security.[5]

Political researchers have described Islamophobia as the perception that the Muslim world, particularly Muslims residing in Western countries, poses a threat to Western people, culture, and civilization.[6] Other indicators used to identify Islamophobia include the portrayal of Muslims as backward, violent, and associated with terrorism.[7]

Some researchers describe Islamophobia as a set of perceptions created and reinforced by specific communication technologies, such as newspapers and satellite networks.[8] According to Asghar Iftikhari, a political researcher, Islamophobia involves the creation of a negative mental image of Islam by Western media, prompting audiences to exhibit negative reactions (either in thought or action) toward the establishment and development of Islamic systems.[9]

A caricature about the attempt to portray a negative image of Islam

Manifestations of Islamophobia

According to research on Islamophobia, this phenomenon manifests at four levels—public societal spaces, groups and political parties, media, and government—through practices such as violence, discrimination, prejudice (stereotyping), and exclusion against Muslims:[10]

  • Violence: Physical attacks, property damage, and verbal assaults.
  • Discrimination: Denial of citizenship rights, such as in workplaces or access to healthcare and education services.
  • Prejudice: Stereotyping in media and everyday interactions, including the publication of caricatures mocking Islam and insults to Islamic sanctities, such as the Quran.
  • Exclusion: Marginalizing Muslims from politics, governance, employment, management, and official positions.[11]

History of the Spread of Islamophobia in the West

According to political researchers, the formation of Islamic movements in the 1950s to 1970s, driven by anti-colonial objectives and the idea of a global Islamic governance,[12] as well as the portrayal of Islam as the primary anti-Western force following the Soviet Union's collapse,[13] prompted global powers to adopt strategies like Islamophobia to weaken and marginalize Islam's role in power dynamics, countering the strategy of "Islamic invitation" (Da'wa).[14]

It has also been stated that Western political theorists, such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, have sought to promote Islamophobia by utilizing concepts like Islamism, fundamentalism, and traditionalism. These efforts, despite certain contributing factors in Islamic countries, such as the violent activities of extremist groups, have been successful.[15]

Backgrounds and Factors

The spread of Islamophobia, particularly in Western countries, is attributed to historical tensions between Muslims and the West, influenced by various cultural, social, and political factors.[16]

Several factors have been identified as contributing to the spread of Islamophobia, including: conflicts of interest and differing value systems between the Islamic world and the West, violent actions by extremist Islamic groups, historical Israeli-Arab conflicts, ignorance and lack of understanding of Islam and Muslims, Western fears of demographic and cultural threats posed by Muslims, and the shaping of public opinion through Western media.[17]

Historical Backgrounds

Many scholars attribute the West's fear and hatred of Islam not to contemporary events, but to historical incompatibilities between Islamic and Western states and the contradictions between European and Islamic values.[18] They point to a consistent pattern of conflicts, such as the rise of Islam and its confrontation with the Roman Empire and Christianity,[19] the conquest of Andalusia, the Crusades in the Middle Ages,[20] the conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and Europeans, and European colonialism in the Islamic world during the 18th and 19th centuries.[21]

Internal Weaknesses of the Islamic World

The presence of numerous weaknesses in the Islamic world has been identified as a key factor in strengthening the Islamophobia project, including religious schisms and lack of cohesion among Islamic countries, underdevelopment and poverty, weak democratic institutions and lack of governmental legitimacy in many Islamic nations, tribal and ethnic violence, poor human rights records and violations of women's rights, as well as deficiencies in media technologies in the Islamic world compared to the West.[22]

Western Ignorance of the True Nature of Islam

Ignorance about the nature of Islam and Muslims has been identified as a key factor in Islamophobia.[23] According to researchers, this ignorance is so profound that many Westerners believe all Muslims are Arabs. It has also been noted that in Western perceptions, no term is more closely associated with Islam than "jihad," a word they view as synonymous with violence and terrorism.[24]

Fear of Islam in the West

Another reason for negative sentiments toward Muslims has been attributed to a deep-rooted fear of Islam in the West. Such fear is categorized into "historical fear" and "contemporary fear." Historical fear, or the perception of Islam as a religious threat, was propagated by Christian missionaries during the era of competition between Christianity and Islam over the conquest of various territories from a religious perspective. Contemporary fear, or the perception of Islam as a political threat, relates to Islam's potential to emerge as a political, social, and economic power opposing Western hegemony. This view of Islam has been promoted by Western politicians.[25]

Immigration and Increased Population of Muslims in Europe

The migration of numerous Muslim groups to Europe after World War II for work and the subsequent growth of Muslim populations in European countries have been identified as additional factors contributing to the spread of Islamophobia in Europe.[26] It has been noted that the prolonged duration of these migrations led to the formation of Muslim communities and minorities, as well as the emergence of second and third generations of these immigrants in Western countries, gradually making Islam one of the main religions in Europe and, in some countries, the second-largest religion.[27] According to researchers, Muslim immigrants who arrived in Europe after World War II had less ability to adapt to European culture due to cultural rigidity, and this lack of adaptation fostered negative prejudices among Europeans toward all Muslims.[28] Consequently, Westerners, particularly their media, became concerned about changes in demographic composition and the resulting cultural shifts, further fueling Islamophobia.[29]

Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism

The rise of ideologies associated with political Islam, particularly through the emergence of extremist groups and their actions, has been identified as a key reason for the spread of Islamophobia originating within the Islamic world.[30] According to researchers, the formation of Salafi organizations and their terrorist activities,[31] indiscriminate killings in Iraq and Syria, and suicide operations[32] worldwide have strengthened far-right parties in Europe. These parties, by linking Europe's security concerns to Muslim immigrants, have further propagated the discourse of Islamophobia and enacted discriminatory laws against Muslims.[33]

Media Activities

The use of diverse media capabilities and their profound influence in shaping public opinion have been identified as key factors in the spread of Islamophobia.[34] Some even consider Western media the primary source of Islamophobia.[35] According to this perspective, Islamophobia is shaped by media imagery, and realities are interpreted within the framework of these images.[36] Researchers note that Western citizens' understanding of Islam is heavily reliant on media, with little reference to scholarly sources. For this reason, media hold unparalleled power in shaping negative perceptions among Western populations and influencing their behavior toward Islam and Muslims.[37]

Strategies to Counter the Islamophobia Project

To counter the Islamophobia project and address its causes and contributing factors, researchers and policymakers in the Islamic world have proposed several strategies, including:

  • Developing joint Islamic media to represent a positive image of the Islamic world;
  • Fostering direct connections among Muslims living in the West through NGOs and associations;
  • Establishing systematic and extensive communications with Western religious institutions;
  • Strengthening intra-civilizational exchanges to weaken extremist and fundamentalist movements;
  • Creating facilities (for study and tourism) to provide an authentic introduction to Islam;[38]
  • Enhancing the role of citizens in managing Islamic countries by strengthening democratic systems;[39]
  • Combating symbols of religious extremism;
  • Establishing clear demarcations between extremists and other Muslims.[40]

Reactions to the Prevalence of Islamophobia

In response to the spread of Islamophobia in the West, numerous actions were taken by leaders and scholars of the Islamic world, including a letter by Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in 2015, addressed to the youth of Europe and North America. Following a terrorist incident in France perpetrated by Muslim extremist groups, he issued a message urging young people to seek knowledge about Islam directly from its primary sources, namely the Quran and the life of the Prophet Muhammad (s), rather than relying on media portrayals.[41]

Notes

  1. Majīdī & Ṣādiqī, Islām-harāsī-yi Gharbī, p. 20-21; ʿAlīpūr & Others, Rāhburhā-yi pīshgīrī wa muqābili bā Islām-harāsī, p. 104; ʿAlīzādi & Others, Barrasī-yi pādīdi-yi Islām-harāsī wa rāhkārhā-yi Qurʾānī muqābili bā ān, p. 381.
  2. Muslimī, Islām-harāsī: Chālishī dar barābar-i hami mā, p. 39.
  3. Iftikhārī, Du chihri-yi Islām-harāsī; Salbī wa ījādī dar tablīghāt-i Gharb, p. 31.
  4. Murshidīzādi & Ghafārī, Islām-harāsī dar Ūrūpā, p. 114.
  5. ʿAlīpūr & Others, Rāhburhā-yi pīshgīrī wa muqābili bā Islām-harāsī, p. 99.
  6. Sayyid Imāmī & Ḥusaynī Fāʾiq, Zamīnahā-yi rushd-i Islām-harāsī sākhtmand dar Brītānīyā, p. 101.
  7. Muslimī, Islām-harāsī: Chālishī dar barābar-i hami mā, p. 38-41; ʿĪsāzādi & Others, Rāhburdhā-yi fahm-i pādīdi-yi Islām-harāsī bar pāyi-yi sharq-shināsī, p. 134.
  8. Naẓarī, Farāyandhā-yi huwīyyatī dar Gharb wa bāznamāʾī-yi sīyāsat guzārī mubtanī bar harās, p. 124.
  9. Iftikhārī, Du chihri-yi Islām-harāsī; Salbī wa ījādī dar tablīghāt-i Gharb, p. 31-32.
  10. Ṣabbāghīyān & Khāksār, Nimūdhā-yi ijtimāʿī-yi Islām-harāsī wa Islām-sitīzī dar Ingilistān, p. 144-150.
  11. Murshidīzādi & Ghafārī, Islām-harāsī dar Ūrūpā, p. 124.
  12. Iftikhārī, Du chihri-yi Islām-harāsī; Salbī wa ījādī dar tablīghāt-i Gharb, p. 30.
  13. ʿAlīpūr & Others, Rāhburhā-yi pīshgīrī wa muqābili bā Islām-harāsī, p. 99.
  14. Iftikhārī, Du chihri-yi Islām-harāsī; Salbī wa ījādī dar tablīghāt-i Gharb, p. 30.
  15. Naẓarī, Farāyandhā-yi huwīyyatī dar Gharb wa bāznamāʾī-yi sīyāsat guzārī mubtanī bar harās, p. 120; Dugmjīān, Islām dar Inqilāb: Junbishhā-yi Islāmī-yi muʿāṣir dar jahān-i ʿArab, p. 19-29.
  16. Murshidīzādi & Ghafārī, Islām-harāsī dar Ūrūpā, p. 125.
  17. ʿĪsāzādi & Others, Rīshihā-yi tārīkhī wa ʿIlal-i Islām-harāsī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 115-116.
  18. Tuprāk, Chirā ānhā az Islām mutanaffirand yā mītarasand?.
  19. Tawassulī, Sharq-shināsī-yi Higilī wa sīyāsat-i risāniʾī mubtanī bar Islām-harāsī, p. 59.
  20. Nāṣirī Ṭāhirī, Mabānī wa rīshihā-yi tārīkhī-yi Islām-harāsī-yi Gharb, p. 124.
  21. ʿĪsāzādi & Others, Rīshihā-yi tārīkhī wa ʿIlal-i Islām-harāsī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 105.
  22. ʿAlīpūr & Others, Rāhburhā-yi pīshgīrī wa muqābili bā Islām-harāsī, p. 110.
  23. Shīrghulāmī, Islām-harāsī wa Islām-sitīzī: Dah sāl pas az ḥādithi-yi 11 September, p. 999.
  24. ʿĪsāzādi & Others, Rīshihā-yi tārīkhī wa ʿIlal-i Islām-harāsī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 109-112.
  25. ʿĪsāzādi & Others, Rīshihā-yi tārīkhī wa ʿIlal-i Islām-harāsī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 112-114.
  26. Murshidīzādi & Ghafārī, Islām-harāsī dar Ūrūpā, p. 118; ʿĪsāzādi & Others, Rīshihā-yi tārīkhī wa ʿIlal-i Islām-harāsī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 113-114
  27. Naqībzādi, Aḥmad. Nīāz bi dushman, Īn bār Islām, p. 401.
  28. Murshidīzādi & Ghafārī, Islām-harāsī dar Ūrūpā, p. 127.
  29. ʿĪsāzādi & Others, Rīshihā-yi tārīkhī wa ʿIlal-i Islām-harāsī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 113-114.
  30. Siyfī & Siyfī, Ifrāṭ-garāʾī-yi nuwsalafī dar jahān-i Islām, p. 133; Iftikhārī, Du chihri-yi Islām-harāsī; Salbī wa ījādī dar tablīghāt-i Gharb, p. 38; Murshidīzādi & Ghafārī, Islām-harāsī dar Ūrūpā, p. 127-131.
  31. Shīrghulāmī, Islām-harāsī wa Islām-sitīzī: Dah sāl pas az ḥādithi-yi 11 September, p. 1003.
  32. Zāriʿ & Rustamī, Payāmadhā-yi ẓuhūr-i tirurīsm dar gharb-i Āsīyā bar kishwarhā-yi Ūrūpāʾī, p. 57-61.
  33. Turābī & Faqīh ʿAbdullāhī, Taʾthīr-i zuhūr-i bunyādgarāʾī Islāmī dar gharb-i Āsīyā bar qudratyābī aḥzāb-i rāst-i Ifrāṭī dar Ūrūpā, p. 40-41.
  34. ʿĪsāzādi, ʿAbbās & Sharaf al-Dīn, Sayyid Ḥusayn. Islām-harāsī dar risānahā-yi taṣwīrī-yi Gharb, p. 51-52.
  35. Majīdī & Ṣādiqī, Islām-harāsī-yi Gharbī, p. 49.
  36. Iftikhārī, Du chihri-yi Islām-harāsī; Salbī wa ījādī dar tablīghāt-i Gharb, p. 32.
  37. ʿĪsāzādi & Sharaf al-Dīn, Wākāwī-yi naqsh-i risānihā-yi Gharbī dar Islām-harāsī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 162-165.
  38. ʿAlīpūr & Others, Rāhburhā-yi pīshgīrī wa muqābili bā Islām-harāsī, p. 111-114.
  39. ʿAlīzādi & Others, Barrasī-yi pādīdi-yi Islām-harāsī wa rāhkārhā-yi Qurʾānī muqābili bā ān, p. 397-400.
  40. Siyfī & Siyfī, Ifrāṭ-garāʾī-yi nuwsalafī dar jahān-i Islām, p. 134-137.
  41. Letter of Ayatollah Khamenei to the Youth of Europe and North America Following the Recent Events in France. (Persian)

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