Negation of the Divine Attributes

Priority: c, Quality: b
From wikishia

The negation of the divine attributes (Arabic: تعطيل الصفات) is a theological theory which restricts the knowledge of divine attributes to negative statements, holding that the human intellect has no way to properly comprehend the divine attributes. Opponent to this theory, are the theories of al-Tashbih (analogy) and al-Ithbat wa al-tanzih (transcendental affirmation while declaring incomparability)

Explanation

According to this particular viewpoint, proper knowledge of divine attributes are beyond man's intellectual capacity. Therefore, what is left to us in this regard, is to accept and believe in whatever divine attribute that is mentioned in the Qur'an and the traditions, while we admit our incapability of understanding them. The attitude has been labeled as "negation" because it depicts a void picture of divine attributes.

Pro-negation theologians argue that all human concepts are the direct or indirect results of exercising human sensory faculties in the physical world with all physical limitations. Since God has no likeness to any creature and we have no other concept to describe God with, we have no choice but to remain silent or only repeat the divine attributes which are stated in the Holy Qur'an and traditions . As it has been quoted from Sufyan b. 'Uyayna who said: the interpretation of what God has described himself with in the Holy Qur'an, is to recite those verses and remain silent.[1]

At the maximum, these theologians believe, the human intellect may negate imperfections from God. Thus, this proposition: "God knows everything" or: "God is powerful" is nothing more than: "God is not ignorant nor incapable in any respect". That is, all positive divine attributes are, in fact, negative statements which remove imperfections from the notion of God. Simply put, our intellect cannot describe God with any attribute; it may only remove all imperfections and limitations from God.[2]

Analysis and Critique

This theory has faced several challenges and criticisms.

  • when we speak of divine attributes, we know it by instinct, that we understand them partially, at least to the level we can distinguish one from another, and this is obviously different from the absolute meaninglessness of divine attributes. In other word, it is against our instinct intuition to accept the absolute absurdity of positive divine attributes.
  • It is important to note the precise notion of the divine distinctions. The difference between creatures and the Creator is not that all which is true for creatures, is false for the Creator or vice versa, however, the true difference between creatures and the Creator is to be found respectively in qualities like: contingency and necessity, essential eternity and essential origination and finitude and infinitude. Hence, both God and man can be attributed as knowledgeable, and the meaning of knowledge is clear and universal, but the major differences are that God's knowledge is necessary, not acquired through sensory faculties, eternal, absolute and limitless; while man's is contingent, acquired through sensory faculties, thus temporal and limited.[3]
  • By real conviction to the theory of negation, we may not affirm our belief in one God, nor can we express our awareness of its existence. We may only deny its nonexistence or plurality which, technically speaking, differs from the belief in the existence and unity of God.
  • Holy Qur'an directs its audience to contemplate and ponder over the meaning of its verses, abundant of which are about the divine attributes. If we take the divine attributes as affirmatively meaningless, the demand for such contemplation remains pointless, for it is quite irrational to ponder on something that is essentially void and alien to human intellect. So the attitude of the Holy Qur'an in presenting various attributes for God, is entirely incompatible with the idea of negation of divine attributes.[4]

Notes

  1. Ibn Taymīyya, Rasāʾil al-kubrā, vol. 1, p. 32 quoting from Subḥānī, al-Ilāhīyāt.
  2. Saʿīdī Mehr, Āmūzish-i kalām-i Islamī, p. 202-203; Miṣbāh Yazdī, Āmūzish-i falsafa, vol. 2, p. 368.
  3. Moṭahharī, Majmuʿa āthār, vol. 6, p. 1033-1034.
  4. Saʿīdī Mehr, Āmūzish-i kalām-i Islamī, p. 205-206.

References

  • Miṣbāh Yazdī, Muḥammad Taqī. Āmūzish-i falsafa. Qom: Intishārāt-i Muʾassisa-yi Imām Khomeinī, [n.d].
  • Moṭahharī, Mortezā. Majmuʿa āthār-i ustād shahīd Moṭahharī. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Ṣadrā, [n.d].
  • Saʿīdī Mehr, Muḥammad. Āmūzish-i kalām-i Islamī. Qom: Intishārāt-i Ṭāhā, [n.d].
  • Subḥānī, Jaʿfar. Al-Ilāhīyāt ʿalā hudā al-kitāb wa al-sunnat wa al-ʿaql. Qom: Intishārāt-i Imām Ṣādiq (a), [n.d]