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Secularism, or the Separation of Religion from Politics, is a theoretical framework that restricts religion to the private sphere, isolating it from public and social domains such as politics, governance, and economics. Under this paradigm, religion exercises no legal or structural authority over political and social affairs. Alternative definitions of secularism emphasize the separation of religion from the state, the institutional division between religious bodies and governmental structures, and the replacement of religious systems with non-religious social values and jurisprudence.

Numerous Shi'a scholars have categorically rejected the application of secularism to Islam. They argue that, due to the breadth of Islamic instructions in all human affairs, Islamic teachings and rulings inherently encompass all facets of human existence, both private and public. They draw upon the Qur'an, narrations, and Islamic jurisprudence as primary evidence for Islam's comprehensiveness, asserting that religion cannot be separated from worldly affairs. Proponents of this view maintain that the inseparability of Islam and politics has been a consensus among Muslims throughout history, and that no recognized scholar in the Muslim world ever endorsed secularism.

Prominent intellectuals, including Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, Iqbal Lahuri, Ali Shariati, Hamid Algar, and Abdulaziz Sachedina, also stand in firm opposition to secularism. They posit that secular thought is an exclusively Western and Christian phenomenon, devoid of any relation to Islam. Nevertheless, some Muslim scholars and intellectuals have spoken of the link between secularism and Islam, and the theory of Islamic secularism.

Figures such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Ali Abd al-Raziq, Taha Husayn, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzada, and Mirza Malkum Khan are widely regarded as the pioneers of secularism within the Muslim world. In Iran, thinkers like Mahdi Bazargan, Abdulkarim Surush, Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistari, and Mustafa Malikian have emerged as leading representatives and defenders of Islamic secularism. Additionally, the distinguished Shi'a jurist and philosopher Mahdi Ha'iri Yazdi is often cited as an advocate for the structural separation of religion and the state apparatus.

In certain contexts, secularism is interpreted specifically as the separation of the clerical establishment from the state. Consequently, prominent religious authorities such as Akhund Khurasani, Abd al-Karim Ha'iri Yazdi, and Ayatullah Burujirdi have sometimes been identified as supporters of this delineated perspective.

The crystallization of secularism as a distinct intellectual movement in the Muslim world generally dates to the early 20th century. Pivotal events, most notably the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 and the subsequent rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Türkiye, acted as major catalysts for its dissemination across Islamic societies.

An extensive body of literature has been produced across the Muslim world addressing secularism, reflecting a broad spectrum of both vehement critique and staunch advocacy.

Conceptology

Secularism is regarded as one of the most critical issues debated within Islamic societies,[1] an inseparable part of modern global thought[2] and a foundational principle of Western culture.[3] Multiple definitions and parameters have been established for the term. In a general sense, it is defined as a school of thought that restricts the mission and domain of religion strictly to the individual's life and their direct relationship with God, actively excluding public matters such as politics and governance from the jurisdiction of religion.[4] Other nuanced definitions include:

  • Secularism represents the structural separation of religious institutions (such as the Church in Christianity, or the clergy and the Islamic Seminary in Islam) from governmental bodies (spanning the executive, legislative, and judicial branches). Under this framework, religion is relegated to the personal sphere, while the administration of public affairs is exclusively entrusted to the secular state.[5]
  • A more comprehensive definition describes it as the systemic removal or marginalization of religion from diverse domains of human life, including politics, governance, science, ethics, economics, and the arts.[6]
  • The Egyptian scholar Abdelwahab El-Messiri bifurcated the concept into "partial" and "comprehensive" secularism. He characterized the separation of religion from politics and state institutions as "partial secularism," whereas the total detachment of religion from all worldly aspects of life—encompassing both the public and private spheres—is termed "comprehensive secularism."[7]

Other associated meanings and definitions include the severing of religion from worldly matters, its detachment from social affairs and politics,[8] its removal from governance[9] and policy-making,[10] the imposition of non-religious social values in place of a religious framework, the secularization or desacralization of public life,[11] irreligiosity, the advocacy of worldly principles,[12] and the broader sociological process of secularization.[13]

Under a secularist paradigm, religion inherently loses its authority in political and social discourse, and its communal dimensions are either ignored or explicitly denied; consequently, faith is reframed as a marginal, highly individualized matter.[14] Thus, the underlying commonality across all applications of secularism is the deliberate exclusion of religion from the sphere of socio-political jurisdiction.[15]

Abdullah Jawadi Amuli posits that the core of secularism, irrespective of variations in its precise definition and scope, is the categorical rejection of Religious Government. In his view, proponents of secularism unanimously agree upon the necessity of dismantling any state apparatus centered on religious authority.[16] Marriage is frequently cited as a prime example of the desacralization or secularization of societal affairs. During the Christian Middle Ages, marriage was strictly recognized as a sacred covenant formalized within the church; however, with the proliferation of secularism, it transitioned into a civil, non-sacred contract administered by state registry offices.[17]

The book The Relation Between Religion and the World by Abdullah Jawadi Amuli.

The term secularism traces its linguistic and theological roots to the intellectual shifts of post-Renaissance Western philosophy and the ascendance of humanism.[18] In Arabic, it is commonly translated as ilmaniyya or alamaniyya.[19] Secularization refers to the active sociological process of making a society secular and worldly;[20] it is a shift wherein religion gradually relinquishes its social function, assumes a strictly individual character, and consequently loses its authority over public affairs.[21]

Many Iranian thinkers and writers,[22] alongside various Western scholars,[23] treat the term "secular" as fundamentally equivalent to "laic," and "secularism" as synonymous with "laicism" (laicity).[24] Nevertheless, certain researchers draw a nuanced distinction between the two paradigms.[25] For instance, some define secularism as the broad independence of all social institutions from religious oversight, whereas laicism is strictly defined as the separation of religion from the formal institution of government. By this metric, a laic government inherently stands in opposition to a religious state, positioning laicism as a specific subset of the broader secularist ideology.[26]

Types of Secularism

The strict separation of religion from social life and political structures is formally known as political secularism. Additional sub-categories include moral, economic, legal, scientific, and literary or artistic secularism. Across all these iterations, religion is systematically excised from the realm of interpersonal social relations and heavily restricted to the private domain.[27]

Inseparability of Religion from the World in the View of Shi'a Scholars

Secularism, defined as the separation of religion from the worldly sphere, has been vehemently rejected in Islam.[28] According to Muhammad Hassan Qadrdan Qaramaliki, a Shi'a scholar of theology, no traditional scholar within the Muslim world genuinely subscribes to secularist ideology.[29]

Many scholars assert that the intrinsic link between Islam and politics—and their absolute inseparability—has served as the general consensus of Muslims throughout Islamic history.[30] They maintain that Islam is universally recognized, by both Muslims and non-Muslims alike as a religion explicitly designed to govern.[31]

Prominent intellectuals such as Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, Muhammad Iqbal Lahuri, Ali Shariati, Hamid Algar, and Abdulaziz Sachedina are counted among the staunchest critics of secularism. They posit that secular thought is inherently indigenous to the West and the Christian world, bearing no theological or historical connection to Islam.[32] Advocates of the Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) also stand at the forefront of opposition against secularism. The doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, offering a maximalist interpretation of religion, both affirms the inextricable link between religion and politics and mandates the placement of a qualified jurist at the apex of state governance.[33]

Arguments

Drawing upon specific Qur'anic verses,[34] scholars assert that governance, the adjudication of disputes, and the establishment of social justice are fundamental objectives of prophethood and divine law. Furthermore, Islamic teachings and rulings comprehensively govern all dimensions of human existence, spanning the individual to the societal. The extensive discipline of Islamic jurisprudence serves as definitive evidence of the comprehensiveness of Islamic legal codes.[35]

In the view of Ja'far Subhani, a renowned theologian and one of the prominent Shi'a Marja's,[36] alongside Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, a respected Shi'a philosopher and jurist,[37] the three pillars of state governance are inherently embedded within the core of Islam. These encompass the legislature (derived from revelation and meticulously expanded by jurists), the executive branch, and the judiciary (responsible for adjudicating conflicts). Specific laws governing these three branches are thoroughly detailed within Qur'anic verses and historical narrations. Consequently, they argue that the Qur'an and Sunna intrinsically invalidate secularism and the detachment of religion from socio-political spheres.[38]

Subhani contends that over fourteen centuries of jurisprudential scholarship provide inexhaustible evidence for the presence and necessity of these three governing branches within the Islamic framework.[39]

According to Amid Zanjani, a leading researcher in political jurisprudence, religion and politics are conceptually interdependent; their inseparability is inextricably linked to their very definitions.[40] He identifies the union of religion and politics as an incontrovertible foundational principle within Islamic political thought.[41] Islam, he argues, is a holistic amalgamation of interconnected systems—including theology, governance, economics, and ethics. Analyzing any isolated component while disregarding the others inevitably leads to a distorted comprehension of the faith.[42]

Ayatollah Burujirdi

For an individual who meticulously examines the laws and principles of Islam, there remains no doubt or hesitation that it is fundamentally a political and social religion. Its rulings are not confined merely to acts of worship or the attainment of otherworldly salvation; rather, the majority of its injunctions govern state politics, the regulation of social affairs, and the realization of worldly prosperity. This is evident in laws about commercial transactions, penal codes (hudud, diyat, qisas), judicial proceedings, and the levying of taxes—such as khums and zakat—necessary for sustaining the Islamic state.[43]

The breadth of Islamic instructions in all human affairs prohibits the separation of religion from politics and leaves no room for purely secular interpretations. Consequently, phrases such as "secular Muslim" or "Islamic secularism" are largely viewed by traditional scholars as inherent contradictions.[44]

Critique of the Foundations of Secularism

Eminent Shi'a scholars, including Abdullah Jawadi Amuli, have rigorously deconstructed and critiqued the philosophical foundations of secularism.[45] Among the foundational tenets of secular thought subjected to critical Islamic scrutiny are the following:

  • Rationalism (the prioritization of human reason over divine revelation)
  • Scientism (the exclusive reliance on empirical and human sciences)
  • Humanism (anthropocentrism and the ideological displacement of the Divine)
  • Liberalism (the paramountcy of unchecked individual liberty)
  • Irreligion (alienation from and independence from religious structures)
  • Modernism
  • Permissiveness (the pursuit of absolute and unrestrained freedom)
  • Relativism (the rejection of absolute moral or epistemological truths).[46]

According to Ja'far Subhani, an accurate philosophical analysis of secularism reveals it to be synonymous with veiled atheism, ultimately leading to the outright negation of religion and the supernatural.[47]

Theory of Islamic Secularism

Islamic secularism is a theoretical framework posited by certain Muslim intellectuals who argue for the inherent compatibility of secularism with Islamic theology. While synthesizing secularism with Islam is widely perceived as an oxymoron, proponents of this ideology attempt to harmonize the two by severely constricting the application of secularism exclusively to the realm of state politics.

These Muslim secularists affirm the authority of Islam in providing spiritual meaning and a teleological worldview, but explicitly deny its authority in orchestrating the structural, political, and social lives of citizens. They contend that Islam historically failed to mandate a specific legal framework or structural blueprint for political governance. Through this lens, they construct the conceptual basis for Islamic secularism.[48]

Islamic secularism selectively denies the jurisdictional authority of religion in state affairs and rests upon three foundational pillars:

  • Affirming the authority of Islam in establishing internal, spiritual values related to socio-political life;
  • Denying the authority of Islam in dictating structural laws governing political institutions;
  • Championing the supremacy of human reason in designing political frameworks and state laws.[49]

Arguments

Proponents of this theory advance several key arguments. They advocate for shifting the locus of sovereignty from God to the populace, emphasizing the Qur'anic principle of consultation (Qur'an 42:38). Furthermore, they draw a sharp distinction between prophethood and state governance, arguing that the divine duty of prophets (a) was strictly limited to spiritual propagation, rendering the establishment of an earthly government entirely peripheral to the prophetic mission.[50]

Muhammed Abid al-Jabiri, a prominent Moroccan intellectual, contends that there is no explicit verse in the Qur'an indicating that the Prophet's mandate encompassed the creation of a formalized state or political system.[51]

Similarly, Ali Abd al-Raziq argues that a surface reading of Qur'anic verses and the Sunna of the Prophet (s) unequivocally demonstrates that the Prophet (s) held no temporal authority over the masses other than his role as a spiritual messenger, thus functioning neither as a ruler nor a sovereign.[52] In his thesis, God intentionally delegated matters of statecraft and politics to the domain of human intellect.[53] According to Abd al-Raziq, the Qur'an lacks even peripheral evidence suggesting a religious obligation to forge a state apparatus.[54]

Conversely, Abbas-Ali Amid Zanjani asserts that Abd al-Raziq's framework necessitates the outright denial of dozens of canonical verses and authenticated narrations, flagrantly ignoring both the robust political biography of the Prophet (s) and the deeply entrenched political traditions and governmental structures erected by early Muslims.[55]

Mahdi Bazargan, while conceding the existence of socio-political rulings within Islamic texts, argues that their ultimate objective is the spiritual cultivation of the individual and fostering focus on God and the Hereafter, rather than establishing systemic political welfare, security, or worldly prosperity.[56]

In Bazargan's perspective, Islam deliberately outsourced the disciplines of economics, statecraft, and public administration to the Muslims themselves, entrusting these areas to human reason and historical experience without prescribing rigid doctrines. He likens this to the way Islam leaves mundane tasks, such as agriculture or domestic management, to human innovation.[57]

Consequently, Bazargan views prophethood and governance as two distinct phenomena, classifying the temporal government led by the Prophet (s) as a unique, historical anomaly rather than a binding precedent.[58]

He further contends that the Imams of the Shia functionally separated religion from political administration. He argues that they did not systematically pursue political caliphates as an inherent divine right; except Imam Ali (a), none accepted a ruling mandate. This is evidenced by Imam al-Rida (a), who, despite intense pressure from al-Ma'mun, refused the caliphate, and Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba (a), who strategically brokered a peace with Mu'awiya, effectively ceding political control.[59]

Proponents of Islamic Secularism

The book Islam and the Foundations of Governance by Ali 'Abd al-Raziq.

Several seminal figures are widely credited as the architects of secularism in the Muslim world. These include Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founding president of Türkiye, d. 1938), Ali Abd al-Raziq (d. 1966), Qasim Amin, Taha Husayn, and Khalid Muhammad Khalid among Egyptian intellectuals; Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) representing Indian reformists; and Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzada (d. 1295/1878) alongside Mirza Malkum Khan (d. 1326/1908) from the Iranian intellectual milieu.[60]

In contemporary discourse, figures such as Muhammed Abid al-Jabiri]], Muhammad Sa'id al-Ashmawi, and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd in Egypt, along with the Moroccan intellectual Abdu Filali-Ansari,[61] are frequently highlighted as leading advocates of secular adaptation.

Within Iran, Mahdi Bazargan, Abdulkarim Surush, Muhammad Mujtahed Shabistari, and Mustafa Malikian are recognized as the four primary pillars and defenders of Islamic secularism. Their collective objective has been to rationally demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with secularism through reformist hermeneutics.[62]

According to Abdullah Jawadi Amuli, the religious proponents of secularism can be categorized into three distinct factions:

  • The first group confines the jurisdiction of religion strictly to individual ethics and spiritual salvation.
  • The second group acknowledges that religion encompasses social parameters, but insists that the ruler of such a society must be an Infallible entity. They argue that fallible humans lack the divine mandate to enforce religious governance.
  • The third group maintains that religion is a sanctified, transcendent phenomenon; they argue that entangling it in the mundane, corruptible sphere of worldly politics inevitably degrades and pollutes its sanctity.[63]

Separation of Clergy from Government Affairs

Certain researchers argue that secularism in the Muslim world operates differently from its Christian counterpart, which historically mandated the comprehensive secularization or desacralization of all life aspects.[64] Within the Muslim context, the term is primarily utilized to denote the pragmatic separation of religion from executive politics, or more specifically, the disengagement of the clerical establishment from the state apparatus.[65]

Muhammad Burqa'i, author of Secularism from Theory to Practice, posits that the core challenge of secularism in Islamic societies lies in reconciling statecraft with Islamic legal systems, namely jurisprudence. He notes that in nations like Egypt and Pakistan, while religious institutions such as the clergy and the Muslim Brotherhood do not formally govern, the foundational laws of these states remain heavily indebted to Islamic Sharia.[66]

Sayyid Sadiq Haqiqat, a prominent scholar of Islamic political thought, divides Muslim secularist thinkers into two broad categories:

  • Those who categorically deny any intrinsic link between religion and politics.
  • Those who champion the institutional independence of religion from the political apparatus.

The latter group, advocating for institutional independence, is further subdivided:

  • Separatists: They contend that religion and politics represent two independent dimensions devoid of any intersection. Mehdi Ha'iri Yazdi and Abdulkarim Surush fall into this category.
  • Detailers (Contextualists): They differentiate between the era marked by the physical presence of an Infallible Imam and the period of the Occultation. While acknowledging that the Imams (a) legitimately held political authority, they oppose the establishment of theocratic governance by jurists and their intervention in socio-political affairs during the Occultation. Akhund Khurasani and Abd al-Karim Ha'iri Yazdi represent this viewpoint.[67]

Ayatollah Burujirdi has similarly been associated with the faction favoring the disengagement of religion from partisan politics. From his theological standpoint, assuming political guardianship and administering state affairs are not central to the mandate of prophets (a) and Imams (a); their historical engagement in politics was viewed strictly as a response to absolute necessity.[68] Mahdi Ha'iri Yazdi, a formidable Shi'a jurist and philosopher, explicitly theorized that the core function of religion is not political governance, thereby placing statecraft definitively outside the theological domain.[69]

History and Grounds of Emergence in the Muslim World

The crystallization of secularism as a robust intellectual movement within the Muslim world generally dates to the dawn of the 20th century.[70] Some historians controversially trace the ideological roots of separating religion from state back to the event of Saqifa in 11/632,[71] while others attribute its genesis to the Umayyad policies instituted by Mu'awiya b. Abi Sufyan (d. 60/680) and subsequently his son, Yazid.[72]

As a codified system, secularism originated within Christianity[73] before gradually infiltrating the intellectual discourse of the Muslim world.[74]

Certain scholars view the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha (d. 1849) in Egypt as the definitive inception of secular thought within the Arab sphere.[75] Others argue that secular ideology penetrated the Muslim world concurrently with aggressive Western imperial expansion during the 17th and 18th centuries.[76]

Undoubtedly, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 and the swift ascendancy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Türkiye stand as the most pivotal catalysts for the modern institutionalization of secularism in Islamic nations. Following the dissolution of the Ottoman caliphate, Atatürk systematically engineered a secular republic.[77]

It is widely observed that Reza Shah (r. 1925–1941) mirrored Atatürk's policies by orchestrating a laic and secular system in Iran, systematically marginalizing the clergy from the political arena.[78] The prevailing factors and historical conditions fostering the spread of secularism in the Muslim world include:[79]

  • Reductionist or flawed interpretations of Islamic scripture
  • Rising demands for political liberty and permissiveness
  • Uncritical emulation of Western socio-political models
  • The oppressive nature of traditional authoritarian regimes
  • The pervasive influence of Western colonialism

According to Shahriar Zarshinas, a specialist in philosophy and politics, the formal concept of secularism was introduced to the Iranian intellectual elite around the 1860s, during the Qajar epoch.[80]

Certain historians trace the genesis of Iranian secularism to the writings of Mirza Fatali Akhundzada, arguing that this ideology maintained dominance from the Constitutional Revolution until 1979. It experienced a stark decline following the triumph of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, only to be ideologically reconstructed and cautiously propagated by modern intellectuals in the post-revolutionary era.[81]

Ja'far Subhani posits that proponents of materialism in Muslim nations deliberately package and disseminate their ideologies under the guise of secularism. He argues that explicit materialism—which intrinsically denies God and the supernatural—is rejected by Muslim populations because in Muslim countries, materialism—which denies religion and the metaphysical—is not welcomed, but secularism appears attractive to unwary intellectuals.[82] By contrast, the historical drivers responsible for the emergence of secularism in the Christian West included:

  • Specific structural tenets found within biblical teachings
  • The particular theological interpretations of Christian scholars
  • The absence of a codified socio-political legal system within the Gospels
  • Systemic institutional corruption within the medieval Church
  • The Church's historical hostility toward empirical science and free inquiry.[83]

Ja'far Subhani forcefully concludes that none of these historical catalysts or theological deficits have ever existed within Islam or the broader Muslim world.[84]

Notes

  1. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 19.
  2. ↑ Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, p. 145.
  3. ↑ Ṭāhirī, Dars-hā-yī az kalām-i jadīd, p. 442.
  4. ↑ See: Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 56; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikūlārīsm, Introduction, p. r.
  5. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, pp. 18, 25-29.
  6. ↑ Mishkāt, Farhang-i wāzhihā, pp. 270, 272.
  7. ↑ Massīrī, al-ʿIlmāniyya al-juzʾiyya wa-l-ʿilmāniyya al-shāmila, vol. 2, pp. 471-472.
  8. ↑ Jawādī Āmulī, Nisbat-i dīn wa dunyā, p. 17.
  9. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, pp. 19, 28.
  10. ↑ Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, p. 114.
  11. ↑ Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, p. 144.
  12. ↑ Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, p. 4.
  13. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 19; Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, pp. 115, 117-119.
  14. ↑ Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, pp. 144-145.
  15. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 42.
  16. ↑ Jawādī Āmulī, Nisbat-i dīn wa dunyā, p. 19.
  17. ↑ Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, p. 144.
  18. ↑ Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, p. 145.
  19. ↑ al-Massīrī, al-ʿIlmāniyya taḥt al-mijhar, p. 12; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, pp. 9-12; Mishkāt, Farhang-i wāzhihā, p. 271.
  20. ↑ Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, p. 145; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, p. 5.
  21. ↑ Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, p. 119.
  22. ↑ Khāqānī Iṣfahānī & ʿAbbāsī, Justār-ī dar bāra-yi dū wāzha-yi sikulārīsm wa lāʾīsīta..., p. 61.
  23. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 17.
  24. ↑ See: Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, pp. 17, 35; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, p. 7.
  25. ↑ Khāqānī Iṣfahānī & ʿAbbāsī, Justār-ī dar bāra-yi dū wāzha-yi sikulārīsm wa lāʾīsīta..., pp. 57, 69-70; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, p. 7.
  26. ↑ Nīkpay, Nigāh-i wīzha: Dar raḍ-i nigāh-i dhāt-garāyāna, p. 8.
  27. ↑ Hāshimī, "Sikulārīsm", p. 15.
  28. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 56; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, p. 47.
  29. ↑ Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, p. 163.
  30. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 22.
  31. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 121.
  32. ↑ Mishkāt, Farhang-i wāzhi-hā, p. 281; Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, pp. 121-124.
  33. ↑ Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, p. 121.
  34. ↑ See: Qur'an 2:213; Qur'an 57:25.
  35. ↑ Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, pp. 47-48.
  36. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 56.
  37. ↑ Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Naẓariyya-yi siyāsī-yi islām, vol. 1, pp. 46-50.
  38. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 56.
  39. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 57.
  40. ↑ ʿAmīd Zanjānī, Mabānī-yi andīshih-yi siyāsī-yi islām, p. 68.
  41. ↑ ʿAmīd Zanjānī, Mabānī-yi andīshih-yi siyāsī-yi islām, p. 69.
  42. ↑ ʿAmīd Zanjānī, Mabānī-yi andīshih-yi siyāsī-yi islām, p. 122.
  43. ↑ Muntaẓirī, al-Badr al-zāhir, p. 74.
  44. ↑ Mishkāt, Farhang-i wāzhihā, p. 280.
  45. ↑ See: Jawādī Āmulī, Nisbat-i dīn wa dunyā, pp. 33-62; Subḥānī, "Mabānī-yi sikulārīsm", pp. 15-17; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, pp. 74-304.
  46. ↑ See: Jawādī Āmulī, Nisbat-i dīn wa dunyā, pp. 33-62; Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, pp. 74-245; Asadʿalīzāda, Islām wa chālish-hā-yi fikrī-yi muʿāṣir, pp. 35-67.
  47. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 42.
  48. ↑ Mīraḥmadī, Sikulārīsm-i islāmī; naqdī bar dīdgāh-i roushanfikrān-i musalmān, p. 104.
  49. ↑ Mīraḥmadī, Sikulārīsm-i islāmī; naqdī bar dīdgāh-i roushanfikrān-i musalmān, pp. 106-115.
  50. ↑ Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, pp. 173-184.
  51. ↑ Mīr-Aḥmadī, Sikulārīsm-i islāmī; naqdī bar dīdgāh-i rushanfikrān-i musalmān, p. 84.
  52. ↑ ʿAbd al-Rāziq, al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm, pp. 71-76.
  53. ↑ ʿAbd al-Rāziq, al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm, p. 78.
  54. ↑ ʿAmīd Zanjānī, Mabānī-yi andīshih-yi siyāsī-yi islām, p. 62.
  55. ↑ ʿAmīd Zanjānī, Mabānī-yi andīshih-yi siyāsī-yi islām, pp. 64-65.
  56. ↑ Bāzargān, Ākhirat wa khudā, hadaf-i biʿthat-i anbiyā, pp. 52-53.
  57. ↑ Bāzargān, Ākhirat wa khudā, hadaf-i biʿthat-i anbiyā, p. 56.
  58. ↑ Bāzargān, Ākhirat wa khudā, hadaf-i biʿthat-i anbiyā, p. 56.
  59. ↑ Bāzargān, Ākhirat wa khudā, hadaf-i biʿthat-i anbiyā, pp. 49-50.
  60. ↑ Asadʿalīzāda, Islām wa chālish-hā-yi fikrī-yi muʿāṣir, pp. 72-73.
  61. ↑ Mīraḥmadī, Sikulārīsm-i islāmī; naqdī bar dīdgāh-i rushanfikrān-i musalmān, pp. 80-81.
  62. ↑ Mīraḥmadī, Sikulārīsm-i islāmī; naqdī bar dīdgāh-i ruushanfikrān-i musalmān, p. 51.
  63. ↑ Jawādī Āmulī, Nisbat-i dīn wa dunyā, pp. 66-67.
  64. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 123; Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, p. 122.
  65. ↑ Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, p. 122.
  66. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 123.
  67. ↑ Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, pp. 123-125.
  68. ↑ Ḥaqīqat, Tashayyuʿ wa ʿurfī-garāyī, pp. 126, 128.
  69. ↑ Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, pp. 264-265; Kadīwar, Naẓariyya-yi nuhum: Wikālat-i mālikān-i shakhṣī-yi mushāʿ, p. ?
  70. ↑ Mīraḥmadī, Sikulārīsm-i islāmī; naqdī bar dīdgāh-i rushanfikrān-i musalmān, pp. 17-18.
  71. ↑ Asadʿalīzāda, Islām wa chālish-hā-yi fikrī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 68.
  72. ↑ Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, pp. 115-116.
  73. ↑ The terms secularism and secularization were first used in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which emphasized the separation of Church sovereignty from politics. (Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, p. 145.) This term was also used during the same period to refer to the separation of sacred affairs from worldly affairs. (Asadʿalīzāda, Islām wa chālish-hā-yi fikrī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 13.) The term secularism was first proposed in 1846 in England by George Holyoake, who called for the transfer of education, health, and public services from religious institutions to the state. (Burqaʿī, Sikulārīsm az naẓar tā ʿamal, p. 17).
  74. ↑ Rabbānī Gulpāyigānī, Naqd-i mabānī-yi sikulārīsm, Introduction, p. r.
  75. ↑ See: Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, p. 117; Asadʿalīzāda, Islām wa chālish-hā-yi fikrī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 71.
  76. ↑ See: Asadʿalīzāda, Islām wa chālish-hā-yi fikrī-yi muʿāṣir, p. 71; Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, p. 117.
  77. ↑ Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, p. 118; Asadʿalīzāda, Islām wa chālish-hā-yi fikrī-yi muʿāṣir, pp. 69-70.
  78. ↑ Qadrdān Qarāmalikī, Sikulārīsm dar masīḥiyyat wa islām, p. 120.
  79. ↑ Iskandarī, Sarāb-i sikulārīsm dar kawīr-i īrān, pp. 79-94.
  80. ↑ Zarshinās, Wāzha-nāma-yi siyāsī-farhangī, p. 146.
  81. ↑ Iskandarī, Sarāb-i sikulārīsm dar kawīr-i īrān, p. 144.
  82. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 39.
  83. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, pp. 49-55; Mishkāt, Farhang-i wāzhihā, pp. 272-275.
  84. ↑ Subḥānī, ʿUrfī shudan-i dīn, p. 55.

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