Draft:I'adat al-Ma'dum

I'adat al-Ma'dum (the restoration of the nonexistent) is a technical term in philosophy and theology denoting the return of an entity to existence after it has ceased to be, such that it regains all its original characteristics. This concept is particularly salient in discussions regarding the hereafter and bodily resurrection, serving as a focal point of debate between philosophers and theologians. Among Imami theologians, the majority of later scholars, such as Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and 'Allama al-Hilli, rejected the restoration of the nonexistent, positing alternative explanations for resurrection. Conversely, certain early theologians accepted the validity of such restoration.

Within Sunni theology, the prevailing view affirms the possibility of restoring the nonexistent; however, factions such as the Karramiyya interpreted resurrection as the reassembly of dispersed parts rather than the return of the identical entity. Some contemporary Shi'a theologians also maintain that the "restoration of the nonexistent" is not intended in its strict philosophical sense, but rather implies that the resurrected entity is identical to the previous one.

Problem Statement

The restoration of the nonexistent entails that an entity which has perished and entered nonexistence is brought back into existence as its identical self—possessing all its original attributes and features, or in philosophical terminology, with the same individuation (tashakhkhus). This concept is distinct from mere repetition or the creation of a similar entity. Ibn Sina regarded the impossibility of restoring the nonexistent as self-evident.

View of Theologians

The question of the restoration of the nonexistent originated among before entering the domain of philosophy. The impetus for this discourse was the theological premise that ma'ad, specifically bodily resurrection, necessitates the return to existence of that which has become nonexistent. Consequently, theologians engaged in defending the possibility of such restoration.

Diverse perspectives exist regarding the restoration of the nonexistent:

• Early Theologians: In their view, the term "nonexistent" (ma'dum) refers to that which is dispersed, regardless of whether its constituent parts persist, whereas philosophers define the nonexistent as that which is utterly annihilated, leaving no trace.
• Ash'arites: The Ash'arites uphold the possibility of the restoration of the nonexistent based on scriptural evidence. They argue that God, possessing the attributes of "al-Mubdi'" (the Originator) and "al-Mu'id" (the Restorer), is capable of recreating any contingent entity, be it substance (jawhar) or accident ('arad). In their view, the restoration of an entity is analogous to its initial creation.
• Mu'tazilites: The Mu'tazilites stipulate three conditions for the restoration of the nonexistent: First, the existent must be permanent (baqi), as transient phenomena restricted to a specific time (such as sound and motion) cannot be restored. Second, the existent must be a direct act of God, for the acts of servants are bound by time and space. Third, its creation must be immediate and unmediated; thus, entities generated through other existents (such as generated effects) are not subject to restoration. The Mu'tazilites deem substances and certain accidents possessing these qualities to be restorable. However, some Mu'tazilites, including the Karramiyya and Abu l-Husayn al-Basri, rejected the possibility of restoring the nonexistent.
• Shi'a Theologians: Shi'a theologians have also addressed this subject. In al-Yaqut fi 'ilm al-kalam by Ibn Nawbakht—the oldest extant Shi'a creedal text—a chapter is devoted to the restoration of the nonexistent. Certain Shi'a theologians, particularly among the early scholars, affirmed its admissibility; Sadid al-Din al-Hummusi is a notable example. Among later scholars, 'Allama Majlisi, while allowing for the annihilation of the world's entities, also deemed their restoration possible. However, the majority of Imami theologians, such as Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and 'Allama al-Hilli, explicitly rejected the restoration of the nonexistent as impossible, a stance also held by figures like al-Shaykh al-Mufid in his discussion on the non-annihilation of the world.

View of Philosophers

In philosophy, the restoration of the nonexistent is generally recognized as an impossibility. In al-Shifa, Ibn Sina asserts that the human intellect intuitively rejects the restoration of the nonexistent; that is, one perceives this judgment naturally without the need for specific reasoning or demonstration. He classifies this judgment not as a matter of instruction but as a form of reminder or awakening (tanbih).

Philosophers argue that the restoration of the nonexistent is impossible based on several grounds:

1. Argument of Time: If an entity ceases to exist and then returns to existence with identical characteristics at a later time, this entails an impossibility, for time itself is transient and irreversible. Since theologians maintained that time has no bearing on the existence of objects, they rejected this argument. They held that the restoration of an entity requires the return of its characteristics, but they did not count time among those characteristics.
2. Argument of Identity: If the restoration of the nonexistent were possible, an object could come into existence possessing the exact characteristics of the nonexistent object. However, in such a case, the new object should not be recognized as the "restored" (mu'ad) original, but rather as its "like" (mithl), for between two identical objects, one cannot be distinguished as the restoration of the other.
3. Argument of Temporal Precedence: If a nonexistent object were restored exactly, the period of nonexistence would constitute a gap between the object and itself, implying a temporal priority that is impossible.

Restoration of the Nonexistent in Transcendent Philosophy

Mulla Sadra, emphasizing the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud), concludes that the identity of any entity is constituted solely by its existence, while nonexistence is merely the cessation of that existence. He argues that one cannot conceive of two existences or two nonexistences for a single object or individual. Consequently, a nonexistent entity (one that has ceased to be) cannot return to its original identity, as this would necessitate positing two distinct existences for a single identity—an impossibility in Sadra's view.

Debate of Theologians with Philosophers

Most Sunni theologians interpreted resurrection as the restitution of the body and its revival, equating the denial of this mechanism with the denial of resurrection itself. Al-Ghazali, in his Tahafut al-Falasifa, critiques philosophers who rejected bodily resurrection and interpreted the rewards and punishments of the hereafter as purely spiritual states. 'Allama Majlisi similarly emphasizes the necessity of faith in bodily resurrection, warning against the interpretations of philosophers who reduce resurrection to a spiritual phenomenon.

Ja'far Subhani posits that when theologians speak of the "restoration of the nonexistent," they do not intend the specific philosophical concept deemed impossible. Rather, they refer to a mode of return to existence that does not imply the physical recurrence of the identical object in its previous state. In other words, the assertion is not that the exact object returns to existence in the same time and place, but that the entity raised on the Day of Judgment is identical in identity to the previous individual. This perspective on "restoration" aligns with the affirmation of bodily resurrection—meaning that humans will regain their bodies on the Day of Judgment—without requiring the repetition of time or worldly conditions. Thus, even if past time does not recur, bodily resurrection remains achievable.

See Also

• Bodily Resurrection
• Otherworldly Bodies