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Export of the Islamic Revolution

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Export of the Islamic Revolution refers to a set of policies, actions, and approaches of the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at spreading the ideals and values of the Islamic Revolution of Iran beyond its borders. This subject has been raised since the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and has been accented in several articles of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly Article 154.

The Export of the Islamic Revolution is defined not as military interference or the imposition of ideology, but as the promotion of Islamic discourse, support for the oppressed (mustaḍʿafīn), and the amplification of liberation movements in the Muslim world. Imam Khomeini considered the export of the revolution as a religious and human duty to confront oppression, Global arrogance, and arrogant regimes.

This policy has been engage in various forms, including cultural and media activities, public diplomacy, and spiritual support for Islamic movements and regional resistance. However, the Export of the Islamic Revolution has always faced different reactions from global powers, regional countries, and domestic political currents, and has been a controversial issue in Iran's foreign policy arena.

Description and Status

The Truth of Exporting the Islamic Revolution

Sayyid Ali Khamenei:Revolution is not something that someone can export. Revolution is not a material that can be exported. Revolution is not a cargo that can be transported to another place or exported to another country. If a revolution is correct and logical, and if it is attractive to nations, it exports itself; without anyone needing to export it. We did not export the revolution. The revolution was exported by its own attractions. ... We do not want to export the revolution today. The revolution is exported once; and it was! The fact that you see Islamic inclination and faith revived all over the world today; the fact that you see nations in North Africa, the Middle East, and the East and West of Islamic countries have awakened; the fact that you see Muslim youth in various countries turning to the beauties of religion and the Quran, all indicate that the Islamic Revolution was exported at the very beginning of its occurrence.

"Bayanat dar khutbaha-yi namaz-i ʿĪd-i Fiṭr (04/01/1372)"

According to Sayyid Ali Khamenei, the second Leader of the Revolution, exporting the Iranian revolution means exporting Islamic culture and human values[1] such as Monotheism, Islamic ethics, the spirit of sacrifice, sincerity, and self-purification.[2] Imam Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution, described the nature of exporting the revolution as cultural and spiritual.[3] Accordingly, the export of the revolution is accomplished not through military and security means[4] but through the reproduction of Islamic teachings and giving identity to Muslim people[5] in order to introduce the true face of Islam.[6]

Sayyid Ali Khamenei considered the universality of Imam Khomeini's movement and the attractiveness of establishing a just Islamic government as factors for the export of the revolution to other countries without the need to interfere in their internal affairs.[7] Article 154 of the Iranian Constitution also emphasizes the export of the revolution by supporting political Islamic movements and their struggle against arrogance, while stressing non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.[8]

According to Imam Khomeini, the goal of exporting the revolution is the achievement of Islamic laws in the world and the attainment of welfare and freedom for the people of the world.[9] Therefore, the export of the revolution is realized when the truth of Islam and Islamic and human ethics first grow in Iran[10] and this country becomes a prosperous and welfare-confirm country enjoying Social justice and other Islamic values.[11] Other goals have been calculate for the export of the revolution, including:

  • Implementing the global goals of Islam throughout the world.
  • flooring the way for the formation of the global government of Imam al-Mahdi (a).
  • Reviving the Islamic identity of Muslims.
  • Unity and confluence of Muslims of the world.
  • Awakening of nations and their struggle against Global Arrogance.
  • Exporting revolutionary experiences to the whole world.[12]
  • Establishing reconci accommodation between governments and nations.[13]

Strategies and Tools for Exporting the Revolution

From the perspective of Imam Khomeini, all lawful tools consistent with a cultural and propagation approach should be used to export the revolution.[14] Various institutions such as embassies, media, seminaries, and Islamic ceremonies are considered tools for exporting the revolution.[15] Therefore, it is emphasized that the export of the revolution will take place through cultural tools and diplomatic methods.[16] In this regard, strategies for exporting the revolution have been presented, some of which are as follows:

  • Conducting propaganda through various media outside the country.[17]
  • Enroll forces and sending them abroad to spread Islamic culture.[18]
  • Presenting good morals and Islamic behavior by travelers and pilgrims abroad.[19]
  • Influencing foreign statesmen by Iranian officials.[20]
  • Creating resistance cells around the world to confront the powers of the East and West.[21]
  • Supporting liberation and Islamic movements in the world.
  • Continuous and tireless struggle against Global Arrogance led by the USA.[22]
  • Implementing the commands of Islam, transforming the country into an Islamic government and society, and becoming a successful model for others.[23]
  • Holding seminars and congresses to connect with other nations.[24]
  • Accepting and sending students to other countries to connect with the people of those countries.[25]

Actions Taken

An image of the Disavowal of Polytheists ceremony in the 1980s

Actions have been taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran which are considered to be in line with the export of the revolution. Some of these actions are as follows:

Obstacles in the Path of Exporting the Revolution

After the victory of the revolution and efforts to export it to other regions, internal and external obstacles arose that challenged the process of exporting the revolution. Internal chaos and disorder, especially in the early days of the revolution's victory, are considered among these cases. Also, the dissoviation of some groups caused Western media to present a distorted image of the Iranian revolution, making the atmosphere unsuitable for exporting the revolution.[27]

The occurrence of the eight-year war caused government and public resources to be focused on preserving the country and the system, paying less attention to the issue of exporting the revolution. Also, some emerging crises such as sanctions and Iran's isolation, the death of Imam Khomeini, the unipolarity of the world, and the conditions of reconstruction after the war caused the offensive policy of exporting the revolution to turn into a defensive policy.[28]

With the rise of national governments in Islamic countries, Islamic and Muslim interests gave way to national interests, which was in conflict with the transnational nature of the revolution. The suppression of Islamic groups and movements by the rulers of Islamic countries is considered another obstacle to the export of the revolution. Cultural actions against Shi'a and the Iranian people have been another major obstacle to the export of the revolution.[29]

The export of the revolution to other countries was considered a major danger to the interests of superpower countries. Therefore, these countries have placed special emphasis on comprehensive confrontation with Islamic Iran on their agenda.[30]

Challenges

Iran's decision to export the revolution to other countries caused tension in its relations with the Arab world and caused the danger of Israel for the Arabs to become a secondary threat, with Iran being introduced as the main danger.[31] The containment and crushing of Islamist movements in countries such as Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, and Indonesia are considered consequences of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.[32]

Muhammad Baqir Hishmatzada, a professor of political science in Iran, considered the imposed war of Iraq against Iran as one of the consequences of exporting the revolution.[33] According to him, regional countries and the international system, seeing their existence and interests in danger with the export of the revolution, reached a consensus on imposing war against Iran and started the imposed war.[34]

Impact of the Revolution on Regional Countries

The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran led to the idea of exporting the revolution in 1979[35] and created waves of political Islam in the Arab world.[36] The most important impact of the Islamic Revolution in the field of reviving Islamic values is considered the revival of political Islam.[37] This transformation was able to spread revolutionary thinking against conservatism in the world[38] and promote the model of religious government.[39] In political struggles, the tendency towards Jihad increased, and Islamic movements accepted Jihad, martyrdom, and sacrifice as their fundamental principles.[40] Slogans of the Islamic Revolution were used in popular protests in various countries.[41] The Middle East region was influenced by the revolution, and the leaders of regional governments became fearful and worried.[42]

With the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Hijab as one of the manifestations of the revolution spread in Islamic political movements.[43] In Lebanon and Algeria, the Iranian chador was used, and in some Islamic countries and even in European countries, Hijab spread.[44] The most direct and lasting impact of the Islamic Revolution is considered to be on Lebanon,[45] among the effects of which the founding of Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1983 is mentioned.[46] In Palestine, the Islamic Revolution of Iran caused Islamic awakening and the formation of resistance currents.[47] Iran played an active role in Palestinian developments by supporting groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas.[48]

The occurrence of the Islamic Revolution led to the revival, amplification, and development of the activities of the Dawa Party in Iraq, which met with severe reaction from the country's government.[49] The founding of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq in Tehran in 1982[50] and the formation of the Hashd al-Sha'bi force to liberate the country from ISIS are considered among the most important instances of Iraq being influenced by the Iranian Islamic Revolution.[51] In Yemen, the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the thoughts of Imam Khomeini were able to influence the Houthis of this country.[52] This influence led to Ansar Allah of Yemen overthrowing the ruling government in 2011 and taking control of part of the country.[53]

In Saudi Arabia, shortly after the victory of the revolution, Shi'as of this country demonstrated in the cities of Qatif, Safwa, Abqaiq, and Khobar.[54] In mosques in Shi'a cities, people distributed leaflets against the royal family, and clergyman spoke against the government.[55] The Islamic Revolution of Iran caused political and religious awakening of Bahraini Shi'as, and they declared their support for it by holding massive demonstrations.[56] The formation of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain led by Sayyid Hadi al-Mudarresi (b. 1957) is considered a prominent sign of this influence.[57] With the arrival of the wave of Islamic awakening in Bahrain, the people of this country, led by Shaykh Isa Qassim, a prominent Bahraini scholar, engaged in defending Shi'a rights and opposing the Bahraini government in 2011.[58]

Proponents and Opponents

Political groups and fronts in Iran adopted different positions regarding the issue of exporting the revolution; some believed that exporting the revolution should be delayed until the country reaches an acceptable level of capability and stabilization of internal conditions, and aggressive conflict with the international community should be avoided.[59] Another group firmly believed in the military export of the revolution. They considered internal development a form of compromise and emphasized the downfall of surrounding regimes with military and intelligence tools.[60]

Another group was the nationalists, especially Mahdi Bazargan, the prime minister of the interim government and his cabinet, who considered exporting the revolution a wrong and harmful action.[61] Despite having Islamic beliefs, they placed nationalism at the center of their movement and prioritized national reconstruction.[62] This group opposed ideological confrontation with the global system and emphasized relations with all countries and joining the international community.[63] They considered exporting the revolution contrary to international principles and considered Islamic values limited to Iran's borders.[64]

Foreign Reactions

The leaders of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, by emphasizing the export of the revolution to other countries, aggravated the concern of the Persian Gulf littoral states.[65] This issue had a negative impact on this country's relations with Arab countries.[66] Arab countries opposed the revolution in Iran from the beginning of its victory, among which Saudi Arabia was more opposed to the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran than other countries.[67]

According to some researchers, European countries resorted to policies such as Islamophobia and Iranophobia to confront the Islamic Revolution and its export, and tried to present a violent image of Islam.[68]

Image of the cover of the book Export of the Islamic Revolution; International Contexts and Consequences

Notes

  1. ↑ Khāminiʾī, "Bayānāt dar dīdār-i aqshār-i mukhtalif-i mardaum", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Daftar-i Ḥifẓ wa Nashr-i Āthār-i Āyatullāh Khāminiʾī.
  2. ↑ Khāminiʾī, "Bayānāt dar dīdār-i aqshār-i mukhtalif-i mardaum", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Daftar-i Ḥifẓ wa Nashr-i Āthār-i Āyatullāh Khāminiʾī.
  3. ↑ Qāʾimī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī wa guftumānhā-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 497.
  4. ↑ Khāminiʾī, "Bayānāt dar dīdār-i ṭullāb-i ghayr-i Īrānī-yi Ḥawza-yi ʿIlmiyya-yi Qum", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Daftar-i Ḥifẓ wa Nashr-i Āthār-i Āyatullāh Khāminiʾī.
  5. ↑ Khāminiʾī, "Bayānāt dar dīdār-i ṭullāb-i ghayr-i Īrānī-yi Ḥawza-yi ʿIlmiyya-yi Qum", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Daftar-i Ḥifẓ wa Nashr-i Āthār-i Āyatullāh Khāminiʾī.
  6. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣudūr-i inqilāb az dīdgāh-i Imām Khumaynī, 1387 Sh, p. 36; Qāʾimī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī wa guftumānhā-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 496.
  7. ↑ Khāminiʾī, "Khuṭbahā-yi namāz-i jumʿa dar bīst wa yikumīn sālgard-i riḥlat-i Imām Khumaynī", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Daftar-i Ḥifẓ wa Nashr-i Āthār-i Āyatullāh Khāminiʾī; Khāminiʾī, "Bayānāt dar awwalīn dīdār bā namāyandagān-i Majlis-i hashtum", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Daftar-i Ḥifẓ wa Nashr-i Āthār-i Āyatullāh Khāminiʾī.
  8. ↑ Qurbānī, "Nigāhī bi jāygāh-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb dar qānūn-i asāsī", Webgāh-i Pāygāh-i Taḥlīlī Khabarī-yi 598.
  9. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣudūr-i inqilāb az dīdgāh-i Imām Khumaynī, 1387 Sh, p. 9.
  10. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣaḥīfa-yi Imām, 1389 Sh, vol. 13, p. 488.
  11. ↑ Qāʾimī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī wa guftumānhā-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb", pp. 498–499.
  12. ↑ Farzandī Ardakānī, "Darāmadī bar istrātizhī-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb az manẓar-i Imām Khumaynī", pp. 201–209; Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 410.
  13. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣaḥīfa-yi Imām, 1389 Sh, vol. 13, p. 96.
  14. ↑ Parvāna, "Ṣudūr-i inqilāb bi mathāba-yi naqsha-yi rāh-i jahān-garāyī dar andīsha-yi siyāsī-yi Imām Khumaynī", p. 179.
  15. ↑ Farzandī Ardakānī, "Darāmadī bar istrātizhī-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb az manẓar-i Imām Khumaynī", pp. 221–222.
  16. ↑ Qāʾimī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī wa guftumānhā-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 498.
  17. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣudūr-i inqilāb az dīdgāh-i Imām Khumaynī, 1387 Sh, p. 52.
  18. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣudūr-i inqilāb az dīdgāh-i Imām Khumaynī, 1387 Sh, p. 52; Yazdānī et al., "Barrasī-yi abzārhā wa shīvahā-yi ṣudūr-i arzishhā-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 264.
  19. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣudūr-i inqilāb az dīdgāh-i Imām Khumaynī, 1387 Sh, p. 52.
  20. ↑ Khumaynī, Ṣudūr-i inqilāb az dīdgāh-i Imām Khumaynī, 1387 Sh, p. 56.
  21. ↑ Farzandī Ardakānī, "Darāmadī bar istrātizhī-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb az manẓar-i Imām Khumaynī", p. 202.
  22. ↑ Farzandī Ardakānī, "Darāmadī bar istrātizhī-yi ṣudūr-i inqilāb az manẓar-i Imām Khumaynī", pp. 212–221.
  23. ↑ Yazdānī et al., "Barrasī-yi abzārhā wa shīvahā-yi ṣudūr-i arzishhā-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 256.
  24. ↑ Yazdānī et al., "Barrasī-yi abzārhā wa shīvahā-yi ṣudūr-i arzishhā-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 257.
  25. ↑ Yazdānī et al., "Barrasī-yi abzārhā wa shīvahā-yi ṣudūr-i arzishhā-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 272.
  26. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, p. 69.
  27. ↑ Muḥammadī, "Siyāsat-i ṣudūr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī; mavāniʿ wa rāh-kārhā", Webgāh-i Islām Tāymz.
  28. ↑ Muḥammadī, "Siyāsat-i ṣudūr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī; mavāniʿ wa rāh-kārhā", Webgāh-i Islām Tāymz.
  29. ↑ Muḥammadī, "Siyāsat-i ṣudūr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī; mavāniʿ wa rāh-kārhā", Webgāh-i Islām Tāymz.
  30. ↑ Muḥammadī, "Siyāsat-i ṣudūr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī; mavāniʿ wa rāh-kārhā", Webgāh-i Islām Tāymz.
  31. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, p. 73.
  32. ↑ Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 421.
  33. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, p. 51.
  34. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, p. 51.
  35. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, p. 51.
  36. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, p. 72.
  37. ↑ Akbarī Karīmābādī, "Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar khīzishhā-yi mardumī dar kishvarhā-yi ʿArabī-yi Khāvar-i Miyāna", p. 34.
  38. ↑ Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 420.
  39. ↑ Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 423.
  40. ↑ Shīrūdī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān wa junbishhā-yi jahān-i Islām", p. 31.
  41. ↑ Shīrūdī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān wa junbishhā-yi jahān-i Islām", pp. 32–33.
  42. ↑ Mujarrad, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar siyāsat-i bayn-al-milal, 1386 Sh, p. 199.
  43. ↑ Shīrūdī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān wa junbishhā-yi jahān-i Islām", pp. 33–34.
  44. ↑ Shīrūdī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān wa junbishhā-yi jahān-i Islām", pp. 33–34.
  45. ↑ Mujarrad, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar siyāsat-i bayn-al-milal, 1386 Sh, p. 201.
  46. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, pp. 121–122.
  47. ↑ Ṣāliḥī & Shahābī, "Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar bīdārī-yi Islāmī-yi manṭaqa-yi Khāvar-i Miyāna", p. 57.
  48. ↑ Hidāyatī Shahīdānī & Bābāyī, Miḥvar-i muqāwamat; sharḥī bar vīzhagīhā wa wujūh-i mukhtalif, 1399 Sh, p. 116.
  49. ↑ Ḥāfiẓ-niyā & Aḥmadī, "Tabyīn-i zhēʾū-pulītīkī-yi athar-gudhārī-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar siyāsī-shudan-i Shīʿayān-i jahān", p. 86.
  50. ↑ Ḥāfiẓ-niyā & Aḥmadī, "Tabyīn-i zhēʾū-pulītīkī-yi athar-gudhārī-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar siyāsī-shudan-i Shīʿayān-i jahān", p. 93.
  51. ↑ Ḥāfiẓ-niyā & Aḥmadī, "Tabyīn-i zhēʾū-pulītīkī-yi athar-gudhārī-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar siyāsī-shudan-i Shīʿayān-i jahān", pp. 34, 152.
  52. ↑ Naṣr Iṣfahānī, "Taʾthīr-i naqsh-i mafhūmī-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar huviyyat-khwāhī-yi Shīʿayān-i Yaman bā taʾkīd bar junbish-i Ḥūthī", p. 66.
  53. ↑ Naṣr Iṣfahānī, "Taʾthīr-i naqsh-i mafhūmī-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar huviyyat-khwāhī-yi Shīʿayān-i Yaman bā taʾkīd bar junbish-i Ḥūthī", p. 71.
  54. ↑ Shīrūdī, "Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān wa junbishhā-yi jahān-i Islām", p. 34.
  55. ↑ Hishmatzāda, Taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar kishvarhā-yi Islāmī, 1386 Sh, p. 93.
  56. ↑ Ḥizbāwī & Karīmī-fard, "Naẓariyya-yi pakhsh wa taʾthīr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān bar Shīʿayān-i Baḥrayn", p. 197.
  57. ↑ Ḥāfiẓ-niyā & Aḥmadī, "Tabyīn-i zhēʾū-pulītīkī-yi athar-gudhārī-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar siyāsī-shudan-i Shīʿayān-i jahān", p. 88.
  58. ↑ Ḥāfiẓ-niyā & Aḥmadī, "Tabyīn-i zhēʾū-pulītīkī-yi athar-gudhārī-yi Inqilāb-i Islāmī bar siyāsī-shudan-i Shīʿayān-i jahān", pp. 88–89.
  59. ↑ Tavakkolī, "Baḥthī pīrāmūn-i naẓarāt-i muvāfiqāt wa mukhālifān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 56; Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 404; Pūr-Muḥammad, "Ṣudūr-i inqilāb, chirāyī, chīstī wa chigūnagī", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Ḥawzah.
  60. ↑ Tavakkolī, "Baḥthī pīrāmūn-i naẓarāt-i muvāfiqāt wa mukhālifān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 56; Pūr-Muḥammad, "Ṣudūr-i inqilāb, chirāyī, chīstī wa chigūnagī", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Ḥawzah; Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", p. 403.
  61. ↑ Tavakkolī, "Baḥthī pīrāmūn-i naẓarāt-i muvāfiqāt wa mukhālifān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 56; Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", pp. 402–403; Pūr-Muḥammad, "Ṣudūr-i inqilāb, chirāyī, chīstī wa chigūnagī", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Ḥawzah.
  62. ↑ Tavakkolī, "Baḥthī pīrāmūn-i naẓarāt-i muvāfiqāt wa mukhālifān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 56; Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", pp. 402–403; Pūr-Muḥammad, "Ṣudūr-i inqilāb, chirāyī, chīstī wa chigūnagī", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Ḥawzah.
  63. ↑ Tavakkolī, "Baḥthī pīrāmūn-i naẓarāt-i muvāfiqāt wa mukhālifān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 56; Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", pp. 402–403; Pūr-Muḥammad, "Ṣudūr-i inqilāb, chirāyī, chīstī wa chigūnagī", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Ḥawzah.
  64. ↑ Tavakkolī, "Baḥthī pīrāmūn-i naẓarāt-i muvāfiqāt wa mukhālifān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb", p. 56; Āṣafarī et al., "Barrasī-yi taʾthīrāt-i muʾallifahā-yi guftumān-i ṣudūr-i inqilāb bar amniyyat-i Jumhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Īrān", pp. 402–403; Pūr-Muḥammad, "Ṣudūr-i inqilāb, chirāyī, chīstī wa chigūnagī", Pāygāh-i Iṭṭilāʿ-risānī-yi Ḥawzah.
  65. ↑ Ḍabaʿ & Mulūk, "Mawqif al-duwal al-khalījiyya min al-thawra al-Īrāniyya", p. 192.
  66. ↑ Ḍabaʿ & Mulūk, "Mawqif al-duwal al-khalījiyya min al-thawra al-Īrāniyya", p. 187.
  67. ↑ Ḍabaʿ & Mulūk, "Mawqif al-duwal al-khalījiyya min al-thawra al-Īrāniyya", p. 187.
  68. ↑ Bāqirī Dawlat-ābādī & Fakhrāyī, "Āsīb-shināsī-yi ṣudūr-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī bi Urūpā bar asās-i naẓariyya-yi guftumān", pp. 87–88.

References

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