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The murder of Malik b. Nuwayra occurred during the caliphate of Abu Bakr, when Malik, a companion of the Prophet, was killed by Khalid b. al-Walid.[1] This incident became a significant theological controversy between Shia and Sunni scholars. Shia scholars, citing Khalid’s moral deviation and the perpetration of this killing, have critiqued the doctrine of the righteousness of the Companions (ʿidālat al-ṣaḥāba).[2] According to Shia researchers, Malik refused to pay zakat to Abu Bakr’s government, as he did not recognize the legitimacy of his caliphate, which served as the pretext for his killing.[3]

Some Sunni writers have labeled Malik b. Nuwayra as an apostate (murtadd) to justify Khalid b. al-Walid’s action.[4] However, Shia scholars and some Sunni scholars have rejected the claim of his apostasy, citing the testimony of several Companions affirming Malik’s adherence to Islam and Abu Bakr’s payment of blood money for his killing.[5] ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb considered Khalid deserving of qisas (retaliatory execution) for Malik’s murder and stoning for his illicit relations with Malik’s wife. In contrast, Abu Bakr excused Khalid for having acted upon ijtihād.[6]

Malik b. Nuwayra was a prominent noble during both the pre-Islamic era (Jāhiliyya) and the Islamic period, having embraced Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet.[7] After the Prophet’s demise, Malik challenged Abu Bakr, questioning why he did not transfer the caliphate to Imam ʿAlī as per the Prophet’s directive.[8] Shaykh ʿAbbās al-Qummī believes that Malik was killed due to his devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt.[9]

Several books have been written regarding the killing of Malik b. Nuwayra, one of which is The Story of the Killing of Malik b. Nuwayra, compiled by ʿAlī Labbāf.[10]

Malik b. Nuwayra

Malik b. Nuwayra b. Jamra al-Tamīmī was a companion of the Prophet and a prominent noble during both the pre-Islamic era and the Islamic period.[11] Malik was a poet and had a collection of poetry.[12] He visited the Prophet and embraced Islam. The Prophet appointed him as his representative in his tribe to collect zakat from them.[13]

According to Shaykh ʿAbbās al-Qummī, a Shia hadith scholar of the fourteenth century AH, Malik b. Nuwayra was killed due to his devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt.[14] According to Faḍl b. Shādhān, after the passing of the Prophet, Malik b. Nuwayra went to Medina and, upon learning of Abu Bakr’s caliphate, protested to him, questioning why he did not transfer the caliphate to Imam ʿAlī as per the Prophet’s directive.[15]

The Killing of Malik During Ridda Wars

Malik b. Nuwayra refused to pay zakat to Abu Bakr’s government and instead distributed it among his own people.[16] According to Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Dīn, the author of al-Naṣṣ wa-l-ijtihād, Malik withheld zakat from Abu Bakr because he doubted the legitimacy of his caliphate and the validity of paying zakat to him.[17]

Khalid b. al-Walid, under Abu Bakr’s orders, set out to confront the alleged apostasy of Malik b. Nuwayra and his tribe in the Butah region.[18] Abu Bakr had instructed that their adherence to prayer be assessed before initiating conflict to confirm their apostasy.[19] Informed of Khalid’s approach, Malik, to demonstrate his good intentions and dispel the misconception that his tribe had prepared an army, dispersed the gatherings of his people to avoid the appearance of military formation.[20] Some of the Ansar, observing Malik and his tribe’s commitment to prayer, opposed Khalid b. al-Walid’s actions, but Khalid paid no heed to them.[21]

Malik, accompanied by his wife Umm Tamīm, appeared before Khalid to prove his non-apostasy. However, upon seeing Malik's beautiful wife, Khalid killed Malik and, that same night, consummated a relationship with Umm Tamīm, despite her being in the ʿidda period following her husband's death.[22] According to the third-century historian al-Yaʿqūbī, Khalid, upon seeing Umm Tamīm, declared, "By God, I cannot attain what you possess except by killing you," and then proceeded to kill Malik.[23] The second-century historian al-Wāqidī reports that Khalid had long been infatuated with Umm Tamīm; Malik himself, before his death, had cited his wife's beauty as Khalid's motive.[24] Malik's death is recorded among the events of the year 11 AH.[25]

According to ʿAllāma Amīnī and Rasūl Jaʿfarīyān, there is no doubt that Malik b. Nuwayra was killed due to Khalid b. al-Walid's moral deviation.[26]

Sahaba’s Objection to Malik’s Murder

Khalid's actions, which violated Islamic law, provoked protests from some of the Prophet's companions, including Abū Qatāda al-Anṣārī and ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar.[27] When reports of Khalid's deeds reached Medina, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb discussed Khalid's transgressions with Abu Bakr and urged him to remove Khalid from his position of command.[28] ʿUmar considered Khalid deserving of qisās for the killing of Malik and liable for stoning due to his illicit relationship with Malik's wife.[29] However, Abu Bakr rejected ʿUmar's request, excusing Khalid's actions as a mistake in ijtihād, and described him as a "sword among the swords of God" wielded against God's enemies.[30]

After Mutammim, Malik's brother, sought justice for his brother's death from Abu Bakr, the latter ordered that Malik's blood money (diya) be paid from the public treasury.[31] Additionally, Abu Bakr instructed Khalid to separate from Malik's wife, but Khalid never complied.[32] According to the Egyptian historian Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, Abu Bakr, needing Khalid's services for his governance, continued to employ him; however, ʿUmar did not forget Khalid's transgression and, upon becoming caliph after Abu Bakr's death, removed Khalid from his command.[33]

The Significance of This Event for Theological Discussions

The killing of Malik b. Nuwayra is a challenging theological debate between the two major Islamic sects (Shia and Sunni). The murder of Malik by Khalid b. al-Walid and Khalid's subsequent relationship with Malik's wife are considered among the most controversial events associated with the Ridda Wars.[34] Shia scholars, citing this historical incident, have critiqued the Sunni doctrine of the righteousness of the Prophet’s companions, arguing that this doctrine was developed to justify certain inappropriate behaviors of some companions.[35] According to al-Maqdisī, a fourth-century AH historian, after the issue of Imamate, the differences among Muslims became evident during the Ridda Wars; although Abu Bakr believed it was necessary to fight the apostates, many Muslims opposed his view.[36]

Shia Muslims and some Sunnis reject the claim that Malik b. Nuwayra was an apostate and regard him as a Muslim.[37] The testimony of several of the Prophet’s companions affirming Malik’s faith, Abu Bakr’s payment of blood money (diya) for Malik from the public treasury, and Abu Bakr’s order for Khalid to separate from Malik’s wife are among the reasons cited to support Malik’s status as a Muslim.[38] However, Sunni scholars are not unanimous on this matter, with some considering Malik an apostate.[39] Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, justifying Khalid’s actions, argues that the killing of Malik and Khalid’s relationship with Malik’s wife are minor issues in light of Khalid’s significant services to the state.[40]

Monographs

Below are some of the books written on the murder of Malik b. Nuwayra:

  • The book The Story of the Killing of Malik b. Nuwayra (Mājrā-yi qaṭl-i Mālik b. Nuwayra), compiled by ʿAlī Labbāf in Persian and based on the works of Sayyid Murtaḍā al-ʿAskarī, was published in 1391 Sh by Munīr Publications in Tehran.[41]
  • A Study on the Political and Militant Life of Malik b. Nuwayra (Pazhūhishī dar ḥayāt-i siyāsī wa mubārazātī-yi Mālik b. Nuwayra), authored in Persian by Ḥasan ʿAlī-Pūrvāḥīd, was published by the Islamic Publications Office in 1395 Sh in 685 pages.[42]
  • Malik b. Nuwayra, another work in Persian by Ḥasan ʿAlī-Pūrvāḥīd, examines the incident involving Malik with an analytical approach based on Sunni sources. It was published by Dalīl-i Mā Publications in 1402 Sh in 616 pages.[43]

Notes

  1. ↑ al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, vol. 3, pp. 278–279.
  2. ↑ ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Amīnī, al-Ghadīr, vol. 7, pp. 219–220; Rasūl Jaʿfarīyān, Tārīkh-i khulafāʾ, p. 38.
  3. ↑ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Iṣāba fī tamyīz al-ṣaḥāba, vol. 5, p. 560; Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Dīn, al-Naṣṣ wa-l-ijtihād, pp. 118–119.
  4. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba fī maʿrifat al-ṣaḥāba, vol. 4, p. 277.
  5. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, vol. 4, p. 277.
  6. ↑ Abū al-Fidāʾ, Tārīkh Abī al-Fidāʾ, vol. 1, p. 222; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, vol. 6, p. 323.
  7. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, vol. 4, p. 276; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, vol. 3, p. 33.
  8. ↑ Faḍl b. Shādhān, al-Faḍāʾil, p. 76.
  9. ↑ ʿAbbās al-Qummī, Muntahā al-āmāl, vol. 1, p. 311.
  10. ↑ ʿAlī Labbāf, Mājrā-yi qaṭl-i Mālik b. Nuwayra, Tehran, 1391 Sh.
  11. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, vol. 4, p. 276.
  12. ↑ Āqā Buzurg al-Ṭihrānī, al-Dharīʿa ilā taṣānīf al-Shīʿa, vol. 9, p. 264.
  13. ↑ al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, vol. 2, p. 122.
  14. ↑ al-Qummī, Muntahā al-āmāl, vol. 1, p. 311.
  15. ↑ Faḍl b. Shādhān, al-Faḍāʾil, p. 76.
  16. ↑ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Iṣāba, vol. 5, p. 560.
  17. ↑ Sharaf al-Dīn, al-Naṣṣ wa-l-ijtihād, pp. 118–119.
  18. ↑ Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh, vol. 2, p. 495.
  19. ↑ al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, al-Shāfī fī al-imāma, vol. 4, p. 163.
  20. ↑ Sharaf al-Dīn, al-Naṣṣ wa-l-ijtihād, pp. 118–119.
  21. ↑ al-Wāqidī, al-Ridda, pp. 106–107.
  22. ↑ al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, vol. 2, pp. 131–132.
  23. ↑ al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, vol. 2, p. 131.
  24. ↑ al-Wāqidī, al-Ridda, p. 107.
  25. ↑ al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 3, p. 278.
  26. ↑ Amīnī, al-Ghadīr, vol. 7, pp. 219–220; Jaʿfarīyān, Tārīkh-i khulafāʾ, p. 38.
  27. ↑ al-Maqdisī, al-Badʾ wa-l-tārīkh, vol. 5, p. 159.
  28. ↑ al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 3, pp. 278–279.
  29. ↑ Abū al-Fidāʾ, Tārīkh Abī al-Fidāʾ, vol. 1, p. 222.
  30. ↑ Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, vol. 6, p. 323; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, vol. 30, p. 471.
  31. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, vol. 4, p. 277.
  32. ↑ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Iṣāba, vol. 2, p. 218.
  33. ↑ Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, al-Ṣiddīq Abū Bakr, pp. 157, 138.
  34. ↑ ʿAlī Ghulāmī, “Janghā-yi irtidād wa buhrān-i jāneshinī pas az Payghambar (ṣ),” Maʿrifat, no. 40 (Farvardīn 1380 Sh), p. 39.
  35. ↑ ʿAbbās Nikzād, “ʿAdālat-i ṣaḥāba dar tarāzū-yi naqd,” Riwāq-i Andīsha, no. 28 (Farvardīn 1383 Sh), pp. 42–44.
  36. ↑ al-Maqdisī, al-Badʾ wa-l-tārīkh, vol. 5, p. 123.
  37. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, vol. 4, p. 277.
  38. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, vol. 4, p. 277; Ibn Ḥajar, al-Iṣāba, vol. 2, p. 218.
  39. ↑ Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, vol. 4, p. 277.
  40. ↑ Haykal, al-Ṣiddīq Abū Bakr, p. 141.
  41. ↑ Labbāf, Mājrā-yi qaṭl-i Mālik b. Nuwayra, Tehran, 1391 Sh.
  42. ↑ Ḥasan ʿAlī-Pūrvāḥīd, Pazhūhishī dar ḥayāt-i siyāsī wa mubārazātī-yi Mālik b. Nuwayra, Qum, 1395 Sh.
  43. ↑ Ḥasan ʿAlī-Pūrvāḥīd, Mālik b. Nuwayra, Qum, 1402 Sh.

References

  • Āqā Buzurg al-Ṭihrānī, Muḥammad Muḥsin. al-Dharīʿa ilā taṣānīf al-Shīʿa. Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwāʾ, 1403 AH.
  • Amīnī, ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn. al-Ghadīr fī al-kitāb wa-l-sunna wa-l-adab. Qum: Markaz al-Ghadīr li-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 1416 AH.
  • Abū al-Fidāʾ, Ismāʿīl b. ʿAlī. Tārīkh Abī al-Fidāʾ. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1417 AH.
  • al-Dhahabī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. Tārīkh al-Islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-aʿlām. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1413 AH.
  • Ghulāmī, ʿAlī. “Janghā-yi irtidād wa buhrān-i jāneshinī pas az Payghambar (ṣ).” Maʿrifat, no. 40 (1380 Sh), pp. 39–40.
  • Haykal, Muḥammad Ḥusayn. al-Ṣiddīq Abū Bakr. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, n.d.
  • Ibn al-Athīr, ʿAlī b. Abī al-Karam. Usd al-ghāba fī maʿrifat al-ṣaḥāba. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1409 AH.
  • Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī. al-Iṣāba fī tamyīz al-ṣaḥāba. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1415 AH.
  • Ibn Kathīr, Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar. al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1407 AH.
  • Ibn Khaldūn, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad. Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1408 AH.
  • Jaʿfarīyān, Rasūl. Tārīkh-i khulafāʾ. Qum: Dalīl-i Mā, 1394 Sh.
  • al-Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir. Biḥār al-anwār. Beirut: Dār al-Riḍā, 1403 AH.
  • al-Maqdisī, Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir. al-Badʾ wa-l-tārīkh. Port Said/Beirut: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, n.d.
  • al-Qummī, ʿAbbās. Muntahā al-āmāl. Qum: Dalīl-i Mā, 1379 AH.
  • Nikzād, ʿAbbās. “ʿAdālat-i ṣaḥāba dar tarāzū-yi naqd.” Riwāq-i Andīsha, no. 28 (1383 Sh), pp. 42–44.
  • Sharaf al-Dīn, Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn. al-Naṣṣ wa-l-ijtihād. Qom: Abū Mujtabā, 1404 AH.
  • al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn. al-Shāfī fī al-imāma. Tehran: Muʾassasat al-Ṣādiq (ʿa), 1410 AH.
  • al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad b. Jarīr. Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk. Beirut: Dār al-Turāth, 1387 AH.
  • al-Wāqidī, Muḥammad b. ʿUmar. al-Ridda. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1410 AH.
  • al-Yaʿqūbī, Aḥmad b. Abī Yaʿqūb. Tārīkh al-Yaʿqūbī. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.
  • Labbāf, ʿAlī. Mājrā-yi qaṭl-i Mālik b. Nuwayra. Tehran: Munīr, 1391 Sh.
  • ʿAlī-Pūrvāḥīd, Ḥasan. Pazhūhishī dar ḥayāt-i siyāsī wa mubārazātī-yi Mālik b. Nuwayra. Qum: Daftar-i Nashr-i Islāmī, 1395 Sh.
  • ʿAlī-Pūrvāḥīd, Ḥasan. Mālik b. Nuwayra. Qum: Dalīl-i Mā, 1402 Sh.

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Ansar Allah Movement (Yemen)

The Ansar Allah movement, commonly known as the Houthis, is a politico-religious movement rooted in Zaidi Shia Islam in Yemen. Established in 1990, the movement has expanded its influence and currently controls Sana’a, the capital, along with other regions of the country. Ansar Allah is widely regarded as being influenced by the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the ideological framework of Imam Khomeini. The establishment of the Houthi government is viewed as a continuation of the Zaidi Imamate in Yemen, which began in the 3rd century AH and lasted for over 1,100 years.

The confrontation between Ansar Allah and the United States, alongside the Yemeni government's alliance with the U.S., led to armed conflict. In its initial conflict with the Yemeni government, Husayn al-Houthi, the movement's founder, was killed. With the rise of the Arab Spring, the Houthis seized control of Sana’a. Saudi Arabia, under the guise of an Arab coalition aiming to retake areas controlled by Ansar Allah, targeted the movement, but this effort ultimately failed due to the Houthis' resistance.

In response to Israeli attacks on Gaza and the massacre of Palestinian civilians, Ansar Allah targeted objectives in occupied Palestine as well as Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The movement is classified as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council, several Arab countries, and the United States.

Description and Position

Ansar Allah is recognized as a religious movement with a unique political and ideological framework. Its members primarily follow the Jarudiyya school, a branch of Zaydi Shi'ism, and is often considered the closest Zaidi sect to Twelver Shi'ism. The movement is viewed as a continuation of the Zaidi Imamate in Yemen, established by Yahya b. al-Husayn, known as al-Hadi ila l-Haqq (d. 298 AH), lasted over eleven centuries.

The movement's initial core was a cultural association called Shabab al-Mu'min, founded in 1990. After Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi became its leader, the association was restructured and renamed to the Shabab al-Mu'min group, marking the onset of its political activities. Between 1992 and 2004, the group intensified its cultural initiatives and began its armed struggle.

Several factors contributed to the formation of the group, including the neglect of regions inhabited by the Houthi people by the Yemeni government, the rising influence of Salafi and Wahhabi groups, and the spread of their ideology in northern Yemen, which posed a significant threat to the local Zaidi identity.

The Houthi population is estimated to constitute approximately 40% of Yemen's total population. The term "Houthi," which refers to both the movement and its leaders, is derived from the name of the town of Huth, located in the southern part of the Saada governorate.

Organizational Structure

The governance system of Ansar Allah of Yemen is derived from the traditional Zaydi methodology, dynastic rule, and certain institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, framed within a republican system. Ansar Allah has three executive organizations that operate directly under the supervision of the movement's leader:

Political Council: An executive body responsible for managing the movement's relations with political groups and parties, diplomatic delegations, and regional organizations. It also prepares and presents reports, studies, and political analyses. Executive Council: Composed of organs related to the people, such as the Department of Culture and Education, the social department, the media organization, women's affairs, and the governorates. Governmental Affairs Organization: Among the duties ascribed to this organization is the supervision of Ansar Allah's representatives within the state's executive and legislative institutions.

Relations with Iran

The Ansar Allah movement is widely considered to be influenced by Imam Khomeini and his revolution, which was introduced to the Yemeni public as a model by Husayn al-Houthi. The movement's opposition to the United States and Israel is perceived as being shaped by the ideological framework of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Iran is introduced as the financial and military supporter of Ansar Allah of Yemen. It is said that during Badr al-Din al-Houthi's residence in Iran, Yemeni youth received military, security, and ideological training in Iran. Opponents of Ansar Allah view this movement as Iran's arm in Yemen.

International and Regional Sanctions

In 2014 and subsequent years, several Ansar Allah members, including 'Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, were placed on the sanctions list of the United Nations Security Council. In 2022, the UN Security Council placed the Ansar Allah movement under an arms embargo. In the same year, the Arab Interior Ministers Council placed this movement on its list of terrorist organizations. Other countries, such as the United States, have also declared the movement a terrorist organization.

Movement Leaders

Since its inception and throughout its path toward governance, the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen has had multiple leaders. Here are some of the prominent figures:

Husayn al-Houthi

Husayn al-Houthi, the son of Badr al-Din al-Houthi, is regarded as the founder and first leader of the Ansar Allah movement. He was martyred in 2004 during the first war between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. His ideas form the ideological charter of the Ansar Allah movement.

'Badr al-Din al-Houthi

Badr al-Din al-Houthi was a prominent Zaydi religious authority and is considered the spiritual father of the Ansar Allah movement. Alongside other Zaydi scholars in Yemen, he worked to counter the influence of Wahhabi ideology. Badr al-Din is regarded as a supporter of Iran's Islamic Revolution and as having been influenced by the ideas of Imam Khomeini. Due to pressures and threats from Wahhabi groups, he left Yemen for Iran and resided for a time in the city of Qom. This stay served as a prelude to his deeper engagement with Twelver Shi'ism and the Islamic Revolution.

'Abd al-Malik al-Houthi

'Abd al-Malik al-Houthi is the third leader of the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, succeeding his brother Husayn and his father Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Reports indicate that he was chosen for this position by his father. Some sources suggest his leadership began in 2010, the year of Badr al-Din's passing, while others attribute it to 2004, following Husayn's death, or to 2006. Significant events during 'Abd al-Malik al-Houthi’s leadership include Ansar Allah’s victory over the Yemeni government, the failure of the Arab coalition’s offensive in Yemen led by Saudi Arabia, missile and drone attacks by Ansar Allah targeting Israel and its ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and confrontations with the United States and the United Kingdom in these waters.

Confrontation with the Yemeni Government

The Houthi group viewed the Yemeni government as an instrument of the United States and was critical of the prevailing discrimination, poverty, governmental dependency, and foreign interference in Yemen's affairs. Following the September 11th attacks, the subsequent US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and America's military presence in the region and the Gulf of Aden, the movement adopted a staunchly anti-American position. One of its most well-known slogans, known as the "Sarkha" (the scream), declared: (God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam.) against America and Israel. Some researchers have cited the chanting of the "Sarkha" against the United States—which the head of the Yemeni state interpreted as being directed at himself—along with the intensification of the movement's military activities and Hussein al-Houthi's refusal to be held accountable for these activities, as the principal causes for the outbreak of war between the Yemeni government and the movement. The military confrontation between Ansar Allah and the Yemeni government resulted in several wars:

First War: The first war of the Yemeni government against the Houthis resulted in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi. The killing of three government soldiers and the attempt to arrest Husayn al-Houthi have been declared the cause of this war. This war occurred in the Maran region in 2004.

Second War: The refusal to end tensions caused the outbreak of the second war in 2005, which lasted for two months. Ultimately, the Yemeni government declared victory, and the war ended. The scope of this war is considered broader than the first war.

Third War: The remaining tensions from the Second War led to the Third War. The scope of this war, which began in late 2005 and ended in early 2006, extended to the city of Sa'da.

Fourth War: The displacement of Jews from Sa'da province and the attempt to establish Shi'ite rule in this province by the Houthis precipitated the fourth war. The scope of this war, which occurred in 2007, extended beyond Sa'da province. Through Qatari mediation, this war came to an end.

Fifth War: This war began in 2008 and embroiled the provinces of San'a and Amran. The conflict was terminated by the government's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire.

Sixth War: The Houthis were accused of kidnapping foreign nationals, leading to the sixth war in August 2009. The Yemeni government extensively utilized airstrikes, while Houthis crossed into Saudi Arabia and reportedly killed two soldiers. The Houthis’ withdrawal from Saudi territory in 2010 marked the end of this conflict.

Arab Spring and the 2011 Revolution

With the start of the Islamic Awakening in several Muslim countries, the people of Yemen rose to overthrow the government, and the Houthis capitalized on this opportunity. As a result of these developments, the Houthis managed to take control of Sa'da province in March 2011 and assumed its administration. They opposed the process of political agreement, rejected early presidential elections, and refused to recognize the new president. After allying with former president Ali 'Abd Allah Salih, the Houthis seized control of Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, in 2014. In 2017, after Saleh attempted to open dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition, he was accused of treason by the Houthis and was killed in a clash with their forces.

===Military Conflict with Foreign Countries

Ansar Allah of Yemen has been engaged in military conflicts with multiple foreign countries, some of which are detailed below.

The Attack on Ansar Allah by Saudi Arabia and Coalition Countries Yemen's President, Mansur Hadi, and his Prime Minister, Khalid Bahah, resigned from their positions. Hadi then moved to Aden and formed a temporary government. On March 26, 2015, a coalition of regional countries, led by Saudi Arabia, launched intense air and naval strikes on Yemen in support of Mansur Hadi. These attacks destroyed numerous infrastructure sites, military facilities, and civilian centers. The stated objective of the operations was to remove Yemeni provinces from Ansar Allah’s control and reclaim government weapons held by the movement. Following the coalition's aerial attacks, Ansar Allah's initial response was to consolidate control over various regions of Yemen to counter both Al-Qaeda and coalition-aligned forces. Approximately two months after the start of the Saudi-led coalition's offensive, Ansar Allah began conducting numerous operations against Saudi Arabia. As the coalition's attacks expanded, Ansar Allah employed ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia with the stated aim of halting the offensive. The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Saudi military sites and oil facilities with ballistic missiles and drones.

Attacks on Israel and Its Ships in Response to the Bombing of Gaza

In support of the people of Gaza against Israeli attacks, the Ansar Allah movement of Yemen has on several occasions targeted various areas of occupied Palestine with missiles and drones. The Houthis have also targeted Israeli ships and vessels destined for Israeli ports in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The United States and the United Kingdom have conducted numerous airstrikes against Ansar Allah in Yemen, which, according to some Western media outlets, failed to deter the Houthis from these attacks. This action by Ansar Allah was undertaken in response to Israel's attacks on civilians, residential areas, and medical facilities in Gaza, as well as the siege of the city. Israel's attacks on Gaza were carried out following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which Hamas conducted in October 2023.


The Axis of Resistance

The term Axis of Resistance refers to a regional alliance comprising both governmental and non-governmental forces, primarily Shi’a groups, operating in Iran, Syria (under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad), Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine. The stated objectives of the Axis of Resistance include fighting against Israeli occupation and supporting Palestinian liberation, countering Western influence—especially that of the United States—in West Asia, opposing authoritarian governments, and preventing the actions of extremist groups such as ISIS. The formation of the Axis of Resistance is widely seen as a result of the propagation of values stemming from the Islamic Revolution of Iran and, consequently, the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran for anti-autocratic and anti-colonial movements.

The Axis of Resistance is characterized by a shared regional identity, built upon common social, religious, and cultural values, as well as influenced by the discourse of political Islam. These elements foster unity among its members.

One of the core strategies of the Axis of Resistance is the enhancement of military capabilities to counter threats to its existence. Strengthening the position of Shi’a communities, limiting the expansionist ambitions of Israel, and shaping a new order in West Asia are among the accomplishments attributed to the members of this alliance, including Iran’s Quds Force, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Sha'bi), Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Ansar Allah in Yemen. The forces of the Axis of Resistance have established networks and news agencies such as Al-Manar Network, Al-Mayadeen Network, Al-Masirah Network, and Al-Furat Network to cover their activities and objectives. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) also produces and broadcasts multiple programs in covering the news of this axis's actions.

'Status and Significance' The Axis of Resistance is regarded as a regional alliance resulting from the expansion of the discourse of the Islamic Revolution of Iran within the Islamic world. According to political researchers, it has fundamentally altered the prevailing dynamics in the West Asia region, leading to the formation of a new order. The Islamic Republic of Iran's support for anti-colonial and anti-autocratic movements, as well as its backing of the Islamic Awakening, are cited as primary drivers for the expansion of the Axis of Resistance, the strengthening of Shi'a communities, and the enhancement of security for both Iran and the broader region. Political researchers posit that what is termed the Axis of Resistance is influenced by the normative outcomes and effects of the Iranian Revolution on the wider world, as it seeks to challenge the hegemony of great powers in international politics. According to these researchers, the symbols of revolution, resistance, and identity were forged during the Iran-Iraq War. After the war, through the process of "exporting the revolution," these symbols found regional and international resonance in the movements of the Islamic Awakening. The strengthening of the Axis of Resistance's presence in West Asia is credited with a range of outcomes. These are said to include: the empowerment of Shi'a communities in the region; the vindication of Palestinian rights; countering the hegemonic ambitions of certain regional powers; securing the prestige of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the fall of several dictatorial regimes; the decline of American hegemony in the Middle East; the challenging of the peace process with the Zionist regime; the expulsion of Israel from southern Lebanon; the defeat of the Israeli regime in the 33-day (2006) and 22-day (2008-09) wars; and the successful resistance against takfiri groups such as ISIS.

Formation and Naming The Axis of Resistance, or the Front of Resistance, is regarded as a regional geopolitical coalition (a military and political alliance) composed of several state actors (Iran and Syria under the rule of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad) and a number of non-state actors (Hezbollah of Lebanon, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement), with the leadership of the coalition reportedly held by the Islamic Republic of Iran. This coalition is considered the result of historical events that took shape in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in confronting the actions of the Zionist regime in Palestine and Lebanon, the expansion of ISIS influence in Syria and Iraq, and the United States' domination over the Middle East region. According to political researchers, members of the Axis of Resistance share common national and ideological interests and seek to confront the American-centered hegemonic system in the West Asian region through their independent and resistance-oriented policies, as well as to struggle against the Zionist regime and defend Palestine. The Axis of Resistance expanded with the occurrence of certain new developments in the West Asian region, including the formation of ISIS and the attack by some Arab countries on Yemen in the early years of the 21st century, and other actors such as Shi'ite paramilitaries in Iraq and Yemen's Ansar Allah also joined the Axis of Resistance. The political term "Axis of Resistance" was first used by the Libyan newspaper Al-Zahf al-Akhdar in opposition to the term "Axis of Evil," which was used by George W. Bush, the then-U.S. President, and John Bolton to refer to countries not aligned with United States policies, in which Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea were called the Axis of Evil. The political term "Axis of Resistance" was first used by the Libyan newspaper Al-Zahf al-Akhdar in opposition to the term "Axis of Evil," which was used by George W. Bush, the then-U.S. President, and John Bolton to refer to countries not aligned with United States policies, in which Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea were called the Axis of Evil. Prior to this naming, Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, first spoke of a "Front of Islamic Resistance" in August 1993 during a meeting with Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, then Secretary-General of Hezbollah of Lebanon, attributing its formation to Israeli aggressions.

'Sub-branches' The forces and currents constituting the Axis of Resistance operate in various countries:

  1. Iran: Quds Force and its sub-branches, the Zaynabiyyun and Fatimiyyun brigades;
  2. Iraq: Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF / Hashd al-Sha'bi), Badr Organization, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Islamic Da'wa Party, Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Sadrist Movement;
  3. Syria: Government forces and National Defense Forces during the era of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad;
  4. Yemen: Ansar Allah;
  5. Lebanon: Hezbollah;
  6. Palestine: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas.

Strategies and Characteristics

The members of the Axis of Resistance concur on several strategies and characteristics that have fostered their alliance. A shared regional identity and the influence of the discourse of political Islam are considered key features of the Axis's members. It is also said that the axis members aim to achieve their goals by enhancing their military capabilities.

Regional Identity

According to political researchers, shared social, religious, and cultural values have created a common identity among members of the Axis of Resistance. Despite geographical distance and the absence of shared borders, these values have helped build a cohesive regional identity. Regionalism has been described as a new type of identity that emerged between nationalism and globalism, seeking to highlight shared social and cultural values and norms of regional actors. Under the theory of regionalism, Axis members pursue their objectives by invoking religious principles such as Nafy al-Sabil (the doctrine of rejecting domination) and opposition to oppression. They also rely on slogans promoting Islamic unity and resistance to global arrogance. The formation of this identity is also said to be influenced by elements that emerged from the Islamic Revolution of Iran, including:

  • Martyrdom culture
  • Support for the oppressed
  • Justice-seeking
  • Desire for independence
  • Support for liberation movements
  • Belief in Mahdism and the concept of “awaiting” (Intizar)
  • Religious democracy.

Some researchers view the formation of this regional identity as being in opposition to another identity and coalition in the West Asia region, which has been formed by several Arab states and seeks compromise with Israel and a reduction of Iranian influence.

Influence from the Discourse of Political Islam The discourse of political Islam [note: A term for the intellectual currents and movements within the Islamic world whose primary objective is the establishment of an Islamic state and which articulate their foundational principles within the framework of Islamic Sharia.] is considered the most significant discourse influencing the developments of the last few decades in the West Asia region. Its sectarian application in the form of Salafi and Takfiri movements is said to have created a period of chaos, violence, and religious conflict in the area. In contrast to the Salafi movements, a new discourse known as the "discourse of Shi'a resistance" is said to have emerged with the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the formation of a Shi'a government in Iran. As groups like Hezbollah, Shi'a factions in Iraq, and Ansar Allah of Yemen joined, and Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad aligned with this discourse, regional developments took on a new shape.

Increasing Military Power to Create a Balance of Power Enhancing the military power of the Axis of Resistance member states and militarily equipping its affiliated groups has been a core strategy of the Axis, aimed at confronting the threats it faces and reducing its vulnerability to rival powers in the region. According to researchers in the field of international security, the increased military power of the Axis members and their convergence with other powerful nations have raised the costs for rival powers to undertake military action against them. This acts as a deterrent or ensures that if an action is taken, the aggressor will sustain significant losses.

Actions and Achievements Since its inception, the Axis of Resistance has undertaken actions and achieved outcomes that have transformed it into a significant regional and, to some extent, international actor. Among the actions of this axis are the struggles of Palestinian groups and Hezbollah of Lebanon against Israel's occupationist measures; the fight by Iran, Iraq, Syria, and resistance groups against the expanding influence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria; and finally, the confrontation led by Ansar Allah of Yemen against the Arab coalition's aggression in Yemen. Strengthening the Position of Shias in the West Asia The profound influence of Shi'a teachings on the discourse of resistance is considered a key factor in strengthening the position of Shi'as in the West Asia region. According to researchers, the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been effective in enhancing and extending the influence of Shi'as in countries such as Iraq and Yemen, as well as in parts of Lebanon. Furthermore, some political researchers believe that the enhanced socio-political status of Shi'as has, in a reciprocal relationship, also strengthened the Axis of Resistance; this is particularly evident in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Husayn, where Shi'as, freed from the restrictions of the Ba'ath party, were able to assume a prominent role in Iraq's socio-political affairs. Confronting Israeli Occupation According to political researchers, Israel's occupationist identity and its non-adherence to the borders established in 1948 inclined the Palestinians toward a struggle against Israel, leading to the formation of organizations such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement and the Hamas movement. These two movements, formed with the objective of liberating the occupied Palestinian territories, have engaged in numerous conflicts with the Zionist regime, the most significant of which include the First and Second Palestinian Intifadas, the 22-day Gaza War, and Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Confrontation with the Zionist regime's actions was not limited to Palestinian groups. Hezbollah of Lebanon also succeeded in ending Israel's 18-year military domination over areas of southern Lebanon in 2000 AD. The confrontation between Hezbollah of Lebanon and Israel continued in the 33-Day War, which was ongoing from late July to late August 2006. Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Hezbollah also entered the war with Israel in support of the people of Gaza, resulting in a heavy exchange of fire between the two sides. In these clashes, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the third Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and a number of its commanders were martyred. The occupation of parts of Syria, known as the Golan Heights, by the Zionist regime during the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab countries in 1967 (June 5, 1967), has been the cause of hostile relations between Syria and Israel. It is stated that Syria-Israel relations became more hostile after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and especially with the presidencies of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar in Syria, leading to the formation of a closer alliance between Iran and Syria. According to researchers, among the most important factors strengthening the Iran-Syria alliance are the two countries' shared views on confronting Israel and their support for Hezbollah of Lebanon.

Confronting Takfiri Groups in Iraq and Syria The capture of significant parts of Syria and Iraq by the Salafi group ISIS and other takfiri groups prompted the Axis of Resistance to once again form an alliance to combat the military, political, economic, and social threats to the associated countries. Consequently, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a military and advisory presence in Iraq and Syria, began its efforts to prevent the advance of ISIS. The protection of holy sites in Iraq and Syria, including the shrine of Lady Zaynab (a), has been cited as another objective of Iran's presence.

Ansar Allah of Yemen's Defense Against the Arab Coalition's Aggression in Yemen

The Ansar Allah movement (founded in 1990) is a politico-ideological movement in Yemen that is said to be influenced by Imam Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. In 2011, during the Islamic Awakening movements, this group rose up against the Yemeni government and succeeded in capturing parts of Yemen. This action led to the resignation of then-President Mansur Hadi, his move to Aden, and the formation of an interim government. Following this move by Mansur Hadi, several Arab countries launched a large-scale military attack against Ansar Allah to reclaim power; however, after several years of resistance by Ansar Allah, this offensive ultimately failed.

Strengthening Anti-American Sentiment in the West Asia

The rise of anti-American sentiment and the decline of US influence are considered achievements of the Resistance Front in the West Asia region. According to researchers, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States sought to establish itself as a superior power in the West Asia to guarantee Israel's security while also securing its own interests. For this reason, it undertook actions that resulted in the formation of takfiri groups, fueled religious disputes, and ultimately led to the destabilization of the region's countries. In response to these actions, the Resistance Front, by strengthening its policy of anti-imperialist and initiating actions such as battling takfiri groups, fighting Israel, and imposing economic costs on the United States, has been able to neutralize American plans while fostering anti-American sentiments in the region.

Media Activities The forces of the Axis of Resistance have established various networks and news agencies to provide media coverage for their activities. Among these networks are:

Al-Manar: Affiliated with Hezbollah of Lebanon.

Al Mayadeen: A news network based in Beirut.

Al-Masirah: Belonging to Ansar Allah of Yemen.

Al-Forat: The network of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.

Alghadeer TV: The television and satellite media outlet of the Badr Organization of Iraq.

Al-Etejah TV: The media center of Kata'ib Hezbollah of Iraq.

Aletejah TV: The media center of the Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq group of Iraq.

In addition to the other media outlets of the Axis of Resistance, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has also provided extensive coverage of the Resistance Front's activities, particularly following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, both in its news segments and in its talk-show-oriented programming. One such program is "To the Horizon of Palestine" (Bi Ufugq-i Filistin). Al-Alam, Press TV, and the Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN), all subsidiaries of IRIB, have played a significant role in covering the activities of the Axis of Resistance.

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